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ABSTRACT 
 
 
NISCHALA REDDY. On the determinants of Leveraged Buyouts: A 
comparison between developed and developing economies. (Under the direction of Dr. 
LLOYD BLENMAN) 
 
 
I study Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) internationally over the period 1980-2012. 
Returns on LBOs are on average higher for developed markets. However, returns of 
LBOs during high economic growth periods are high for developing nations relative to 
developed economies. On the other hand returns in developing nations are lower when 
compared to the returns in developed nations in periods of negative economic growth. 
During periods of negative economic growth, the returns in developing nations do not 
compensate for the high risk associated with them.  
Developing countries are more unstable relative to developed countries during 
conditions of boom as well as collapse. Exit times for LBO transactions in developing 
economies are therefore shorter relative to developed economies in periods of high 
economic growth rate. This is because PE investment firms would like to exit soon and 
lock in their profits. During periods of negative economic growth rate, the LBOs in 
developing nations exit sooner. When things go badly in the developing economies, 
they are magnified multiple times. Hence the PE firms would like to avoid further 
losses and hence exit sooner. In periods of low or medium economic growth, LBOs in 
developing economies take longer times to exit.  
Reputed firms and small firms have higher returns and exit sooner. Club deals 
have higher returns and exit sooner when compared with single PE firm deals, until the 
year there was higher government on the motive of club deals. After 2006 there was 
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higher government scrutiny which make club deals take longer time to exit. Club deals 
in developing economies are on average not profitable and exit sooner.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Leveraged buyout” or “going private” is the process of taking the firm private. 
It is one of the many ways of taking a firm private, but I focus on LBOs as they are 
more prevalent in this era of relatively cheap debt
1
. Private equity can be broadly 
defined to include leveraged buyout, growth capital, mezzanine capital
2
 and venture 
capital. It is common for private equity to be the principal descriptor of LBOs. 
Investment firms that engage in leveraged buyout activity are known as private equity 
firms (PE firms), buyout firms or financial sponsors.  
In a leveraged buyout transaction, the PE firms buy a majority stake in the 
publicly trading target firm by using a large amount of debt to fund the transaction. 
After making a significant unrealized return or upon financial distress, the PE firms exit 
their stake in the leveraged buyout investment. In some cases joint venture firms may 
also want to exit what are apparently successful investments if there are public interest 
issues that can become problematic.
3
 
                                                 
1 A number of kinds of transactions can result in a company going private in the USA, including: a. Another company or individual makes a 
tender offer to buy all or most of the company’s publicly held shares; b. The company merges with or sells all or substantial ly all of the 
company’s assets to another company; or The company declares a reverse stock split that reduces the number of shareholders of record. In a 
reverse stock split, the company typically gives shareholders a single new share in exchange for a block—10, 100, or even 1,000 shares—of 
the old shares. If a shareholder does not have a sufficient number of old shares to exchange for new shares, the company will usually pay the 
shareholder cash instead of issuing a new share, thus eliminating some smaller shareholders of record and reducing the total number of 
shareholders. Once the number of outstanding shareholders falls below 500 the company is considered a private company also. Source: SEC 
Rule 13e-3 and Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
2
In LBOs, mezzanine capital is used in conjunction with other securities to fund the purchase of target firm. Mezzanine capital will be used to 
fill a financing gap between less expensive forms of financing and equity. Financial sponsors will seek to use mezzanine capital in a LBO in 
order to reduce the amount of the capital invested by the PE firm; because mezzanine lenders typically have a lower target cost of capital 
than the PE investor, using mezzanine capital can potentially enhance the PE firm's investment returns.  
3 Example: A world leader in Uranium enrichment, Urenco is a nuclear fuel company that was set up in 1971.The firm is owned in three equal 
parts by Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland NV (owned by the Government of the Netherlands), Uranit GmbH (owned equally by German energy 
companies E.ON and RWE) and Enrichment Holdings Ltd (owned by the Government of the United Kingdom and managed by the Shareholder 
Executive) and profitable.  The firm was initially set up with a treaty that restricts sale of stakes. The firm is up for sale now. The Dutch 
government said it wanted to sell shares provided “public interest in terms of nonproliferation, nuclear safety, and supply security” could be 
safeguarded. 
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In the case of a successful investment, this is called harvesting. The PE firms 
typically want a return of several multiples on their initial investment and are therefore 
not quick to exit a successful investment. They on the other hand are quicker to exit a 
failed investment or one that has little chance for success.  
When the PE firms make an investment, they do not intend to control the target 
firm’s daily operations. Arzac (1992) mentions that PE firms are considered to be 
outside investors. They require a qualified management team to manage daily 
operations. The management team is also required to oversee the PE firms exit and 
effectively market the target firm to potential buyers or investors during exit. Hence the 
management team should work in line with the PE firms’ interests. Liebeskind, 
Wiersema and Hansen (1992) mentioned that LBOs increase the proportion held by 
managers increasing the correlation of their rewards with the value of the firm and 
aligning their interests more closely with those of non-managerial stock-holders. 
I assume that the PE firms exit through either one of the four methods i.e., 
public offering, strategic sale, secondary LBO and bankruptcy. This classification is 
based on Kaplan and Stromberg (2009).  
In this dissertation, I explain and compare the returns on leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) in developed economies with those of developing economies (including newly 
industrialized economies). The data consists of leveraged buyout transactions from 
1980 – April 2012. This covers both periods of recession and economic boom.  This 
data set covers the period analyzed by Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) and Stromberg 
(2008). My research verifies some of their findings and provide new results in this area. 
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They primarily find that smaller firms exit sooner and so do reputed firms and 
syndicated firms.  
In general most studies have looked at leveraged buyouts in developed 
economies. Very few studies have looked at LBOs in developing markets. My study is 
one of the few to do so. Stromberg (2008) covers leveraged buyout activity around the 
globe. He compares LBOs exit methods and holding periods from 1970 – 2007. He 
finds that LBOs take longer times to exit than what has been documented in previous 
studies. He also found that when there is an experienced PE firm involved in the 
transactions, the LBOs take shorter time to exit, more likely to go public and less likely 
to end up in a bankruptcy. Leeds and Sunderland (2003) find that on average returns of 
leveraged buyout activity in developing economies are lower when compared with 
developed economies, and they do not compensate for the high risk involved in these 
transactions.  
In my study, I look at leveraged buyout transactions in different growth phases 
of the economy and compare developed and developing economies. I find that returns 
to leveraged buyouts are higher for the developed economies on average, across all 
phases of the business cycle, as compared to those in developing economies. However 
in periods of high economic growth, returns of leveraged buyouts in developing 
economies are higher than those in developed economies.  
A developed country has a highly developed economy and advanced 
technological infrastructure relative to less developed nations. Most commonly, the 
criteria for evaluating the degree of economic development are gross domestic product 
(GDP), the per capita income, level of industrialization, amount of widespread 
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infrastructure and general standard of living. Most of the LBO or M&A activity takes 
place in these countries with the USA being the highest rated country in the level of 
LBO activity. Some of the countries that can be considered as developed are: USA, 
Canada, UK, Netherlands, Japan, Australia, Norway, Denmark, Germany and others.  
Developing countries are also called less-developed countries (LDC), and they 
are   nations with low living standard, undeveloped industrial base, and low Human 
Development Index (HDI) relative to other countries. LBOs in developing countries 
may be attractive mainly due to a  low hurdle for the set of rules that need to be 
complied  with, and also due the presence of growth opportunities for in particular, 
foreign investments.    
Newly industrialized countries (NICs) are countries with economies that are 
more advanced than developing economies but not yet considered developed: Brazil, 
China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Turkey are examples of such countries. These countries are of particular interest since 
they have tremendous growth opportunities which attract lots of LBO or M&A activity.  
Returns to leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are, on average found to be higher for 
targets that are from developed nations. Previous research in this area shows that LBO 
transactions in developing markets do not compensate for the risk inherent in the deals. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010), find that investments in 
developing countries exhibit poorer performance when compared to returns to 
investments in developed countries. This may be a result of costly learning, lower 
leverage, poorer legal environments and limited exit routes in developing countries. 
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Leeds and Sunderland (2003), find that the returns to investments in developing 
markets do not compensate for the high risk involved in the transactions. This is mainly 
due to low standards of corporate governance in terms of quality of information 
required for investment decisions, weaknesses in legal systems to enforce legal 
contracts and protecting all classes of investors; and the inability of domestic equity 
markets to offer reasonable exit prospects through public offering. Their study just 
addresses the average behavior of returns, without making any allowance for the states 
of the economies in those developing markets. 
However, in this dissertation, I specifically address the states of the economies, 
I divide economic growth into four different categories using GDP growth rate as the 
benchmark. Negative economic growth phases are periods when the GDP growth rate 
was less than 0%; Low economic growth is when GDP growth rate was greater than 
0% but less than 2%; Moderate economic growth is when the GDP growth rate was 
greater than 2% and less than 5%; and high GDP growth is when the GDP growth rate 
of country was greater than 5% during the time of the LBO transaction or exit. I then 
compare how the returns and the number of days to exit of the LBO vary in these four 
categories of GDP benchmarks for both developed and developing countries.  
I expect to find that the returns to LBOs in developing nations are higher during 
the periods when the growth of the economy is above a given benchmark level when 
compared to returns of LBOs in the developed nations. This is because in periods of 
high economic growth, developing economies have a higher growth rate in general 
when compared to developed economies. This is evident from the high GDP growth 
rates among some of the developing economies. Whereas when the growth of the 
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economy is moderate or slow, then the returns of LBOs in the developing nations do 
not compensate for the risk inherent in the investments in developed nations. Hence 
during low or moderate economic growth periods, the returns of LBOs in the developed 
nations will be higher relative to those in developing countries.  
I also look at how the number of days to exit the LBO is affected by the 
economic conditions and other factors. I find that PE firms invested in developing 
economies exit sooner when the economic growth rate is negative and also when the 
growth rate is high. This is because when the economic growth is negative, in 
developing economies, PE investors would like to exit sooner to avoid major losses. In 
phases of negative growth,  the fear of being trapped in a market and not being able to 
exit, is paramount and overriding for PE investors. In periods of high growth in the 
economy, in developing economies, the PE firms would like to take the profits sooner 
and exit. This is a precautionary measure by the firms to exit sooner before the market 
conditions change. 
 Koren and Tenreyro (2007) explain why GDP growth rate is so much more 
volatile in developing economies. They identify three possible reasons (1) developing 
countries specialize in fewer and more volatile industries (2) developing countries 
experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks from macro economic 
policies and (3) developing economies macro economic fluctuations are highly 
correlated with stocks affecting the sectors in which they specialize. 
Graph (APPENDIX G) from an article by Gavyn Davies, March 2011, 
Financial Times Blog compares average economic growth rate of developed and 
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emerging economies. This graph also shows how volatile the GDP growth rates in 
developing economies are.   
I look at the returns to leveraged buyouts from the time of the initial leverage 
buyout transaction to the period of exit; that is after the buyout firms exit through one 
of the following ways: public offering, bankruptcy, management buyout (MBO), 
strategic buyout and secondary leveraged buyout (SLBO). 
In reality, there are many other methods of exiting an LBO investment but I do 
not have access in the Capital IQ data set to finely analyze other types of exits. Some 
other types of exits as mentioned in “La Lande, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (2011)” 
are partial exits through dividends issue and recapitalization, tag along rights and 
redemption rights. 
In the dividend issue and recapitalization methods of exit, the PE firm can 
partially exit the target firm through a special dividend issued by the target firm. The 
type of dividend is defined by the source of funds used to finance it. Non-leveraged 
dividend recapitalization is financed by using company’s cash in hand and leveraged 
dividend recapitalization is financed using additional debt.  
In redemption rights, PE firms may achieve partial or complete liquidity by 
forcing the target company to redeem their stocks for cash. This type of exit is typically 
used as a last resort in case of unsuccessful investments.  
Tag along rights is useful in club deals, where several sponsors own equity in 
the same target firm. Tag along rights gives the holder the right to force another 
stockholder that is selling the shares to include the holder’s shares in the sale, on a pro 
rata basis. The shares are sold for the same price and terms, this is meant to protect the 
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investment and maximize return. In the data, I do not include the above three methods 
of exits, mainly because of their unavailability. Also my data set is similar to the one 
used in Stromberg (2008), in which they use only the four main classifications 
mentioned above.  
The average time to exit the LBOs is 5.25 years. The most common route of 
exit is Strategic sale. Strategic sale was 36% of the total transactions; Secondary LBO 
28% and Public Offering 24% of the total exits. There was also a significant amount of 
bankruptcy (9%). These results are comparable with Stromberg (2008), who finds that 
the most common exit route, for PE and MBO deals alike, are trade sales to another 
corporation, accounting for 38% of all exits. The second most common exit route is 
secondary buyouts (24%), public offering only account for 13% of exits. Since high 
amounts of debts are involved in the transactions, about 6% of the transactions end up 
in financial distress. 
Among the four methods of exits that I consider in my study, the PE firm has 
both advantages and disadvantages from exiting through any of the four methods. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each method as mentioned in “La Lande, Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher LLP (2011)” are as follows:  
In strategic sale and secondary LBO exit methods, the primary advantage is that 
the PE firm can exit completely, as opposed to partial exits in IPOs. Other advantages 
of these exit methods are (1) that the PE can have more control unlike in the public 
offering method where securities law, exchange rules or underwriters control most of 
the terms of the exit and (2) speed of exit. Disadvantages of these methods are that, 
there could be resistance from the management in the sale process and also there could 
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be risks from competitor firms gaining access to information in the bidding process. 
Some competitors may bid just to gain access to the information of the firm. Hence the 
PE firm must be careful and determine if the bidders are in fact genuine. 
In case of a public offering method of exit, the advantages are that: (1) there is 
higher exit valuation, (2) increased liquidity which helps future complete exit and (3) 
management support (the management views public offering as a heightened prestige 
and publicity for the target firm). Disadvantages of public offering method of exit are: 
(1) there is lack of complete exit (shares the company sells in public offering are 
typically too large to be sold once hence there is partial exit), (2) it is a time consuming 
and lengthy process to take the firm public again, (3) it is also very expensive to take 
the firm public again due to various registration costs, fees and other expenses; (4) it 
distracts management’s attentions from target firms regular business; ongoing 
disclosure and reporting obligations, (5) there is often the fear of insider trading 
concerns since PE firm has inside information, (6) loss of control for the PE firm, and 
(7) execution risk the possibility that market factors may prevent the company from 
getting the predicted IPO pricing). In case of an exit through bankruptcy, the advantage 
is to further cut losses and disadvantage is loss on initial investment, and end of 
business operations.   
I also look at if reputation of the Private Equity firm influences the returns of 
the LBO. Reputed PE firms have better bargaining power in terms of negotiating the 
price of the initial LBO. Reputed PE firms can also get better loan terms. Since LBOs 
are highly leveraged, this advantage to raise funds at a lower cost can result in higher 
results. LBOs that are associated with reputable PE firms exit sooner due to the 
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experience of the reputed PE firm. The results are in line with other studies found: 
Stromberg (2008) finds that LBO transactions that are sponsored by more experienced 
PE partnerships tend to stay in LBO ownership for a shorter period of time, are more 
likely to go public, and are less likely to end in bankruptcy or financial restructuring. 
According to Cogut (2011), The Carlyle Group and Platinum Equity were the most 
active in consummating exits in 2010, which was right after the recession in 2008/9.   
Ivashina and Kovner (2011) find that bank relationships formed through 
repeated interactions reduce inefficiencies from information asymmetry and result in 
favorable loan terms for the PE firms in leveraged buyouts transactions. Demiroglu and 
James (2010) found that reputable Private equity groups pay lower loan spreads and 
have longer loan maturities. They also find that reputation is positively related to 
buyout leverage.; Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010), found that small 
investments perform better than the larger ones. They also find that leverage 
(Debt/EBITDA) is directly related to reputation, which shows that reputed firms have 
the ability to raise more debt at favorable terms. I test the number of exits through 
different routes based on reputation of the issuer. The data shows that there are just 6 
bankruptcies when the PE firm is reputed. Strategic Sale and Secondary LBO are the 
most common exit routes if the PE firm was a reputed firm.  
I next look at the effect of number of days to exit on the returns of the LBO. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010), find that Quick flips (investments 
held for less than 2 years have high IRR (85%) and investments held for more than 6 
years have IRR of 8%. My results reinforce these findings. I find that a smaller number 
of days to exit cause the LBO to generate higher returns (table 8). The regression 
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results in the study finds that quick flips result in higher returns of about 7% on 
average.  
I also extend the study of Officer, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) to look at the effect 
of club deals on the returns of the LBOs. They find that club deals reduce the prices 
paid to the target firm during the initial leveraged buyout transaction since they reduce 
the competitiveness during the initial process of the leveraged buyout deals. I analyze 
their study by looking at the returns of the LBO upon exit and found that club deals 
result in higher returns upon exit and exit sooner.  
A club deal, in finance, refers to a leveraged buyout or other private equity 
investment that involves several different private equity investment firms. A club deal 
can also be referred to as a syndicated investment. In a club deal, the investor group of 
private equity firms pools its assets together and makes the acquisition collectively. The 
practice has historically allowed private equity to purchase larger and more expensive 
companies than each constituent firm could potentially acquire through its own private 
equity funds. Additionally, by syndicating the equity ownership across a group of 
investment firms, each firm reduces its risk of investing since it is shared by many 
firms.  
A club deal also reduces competitiveness of the deal since many large PE firms 
combine to acquire a firm. This might be due to the reduction in the number of firms 
competing for the bidding process of a target takeover and hence less lively bidding or 
the effects of active collusion.  
This criticism that club deals reduce LBO prices has strong grounding in the 
auction literature, in which it is well-recognized that bidder collusion may depress sale 
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prices (Graham and Marshall (1989); Marquez and Singh (2009)), and in the regulatory 
economics literature (Cramton and Schwartz (2000); Hendricks and Porter (1992)). 
Existing literature stress that collusion can reduce prices even in the absence of repeat 
play and even if collusion does not involve all potential bidders for a target. 
In a club deal, the consortium of PE firms can negotiate better terms with the 
target firm, either due to reputation of one or more firms in the consortium, or due to 
availability of large funds due to combining of multiple PE firms. The smaller PE firms 
may not have the reputation or the funds to acquire in such cases. LBOs are highly 
levered, and it may be easier to acquire debt financing in sufficient quantity and on 
favorable terms if multiple private equity firms attach their names and reputations to a 
deal.  
In my study, I look at the effect of the number of PE firms (club deals) on the 
LBO returns and also the number of days to exit. From the regression results, I find that 
for every one additional PE firm, the returns of the target firm are higher by 4% on 
average. This is because in a club deal the price of the initial LBO is reduced. This 
results in higher returns at the time of the exit.  I additionally find that the value of the 
firm is higher by 397 Million USD if the LBO transaction is a club deal. This shows 
that club deals are common when the target firm is large. I also find that club deals take 
45 days lesser to exit for each additional number of PE firm (See table 20 and table 21). 
Thus I see that since club deals initially depress the LBO prices, the returns of these 
club deals at exit are higher.  
Club deals exit sooner until the year 2006. The consortium of PE firms in a club 
deals helps easy exit through one of the methods of exit. After 2006, there is higher 
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government scrutiny on the motive of club deals and hence it led to longer exit times. 
This finding is consistent with the findings in Officer (2010) where they find that club 
deals reduced after 2006 since there was higher government scrutiny about the motive 
behind the formation of a club. Jackson (2008) mention that The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) both are examining 
the possibility of collusion among private equity firms and are trying to discover 
attempts by clubs to reduce purchase prices. Both the DOJ and the FTC have public 
authority to enforce antitrust laws against club deals with benign motives. Caruso 
(2006) article discusses a lawsuit filed against thirteen companies that engaged in 
private equity club deals. GAO (2008) develop a model and find results that find that 
the motive for club deals are illegal, such as collusion.  
I also test the returns of the LBOs when the country of the PE firm and the 
target firm are same. The results show that the returns are lower when the PE firm and 
the target firm are from the same country. In reality we might expect that if both the 
firms are from the same country they have more experience and knowledge about the 
local procedures and rules and hence might have higher returns. However in case of 
LBOs in developing economies and also in some LBOs in developed economies, 
reputed PE firms are generally not from the same country hence if the target firm and 
the PE firm are from the same country, the returns tend to be lower. This is tested in 
Hypothesis 3: Reputed PE firms result in higher returns of the target firm and takes 
fewer days to exit.  
I test if the size of the target firm influences the return of the leveraged buyout 
transaction or the amount of time taken by the firm to exit. I classify the targets as 
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small, medium and large firms to test if the size of the target has an impact of the 
returns or exit patterns of the buyout. I divide the firms based on value of the LBO. 
(Small: < $10 Million, medium: $10 – $100 million, large: > $100 million). Demiroglu 
and James (2010) and Lopez-De-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010), find that 
small investments outperform larger ones. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) find that small 
firms, reputed firms and syndicated firms exit sooner. My results also show that smaller 
firms have higher returns than the larger firms. My regression results show that smaller 
firms exit sooner. If the size of the firm is smaller, then it is easier to exit due to more 
available exit options. It is easier to find buyers in case of secondary LBO or strategic 
sale. These results contradict the finding in Stromberg (2008), who found that smaller 
LBOs remain owned by the buyout firm for a longer period. The finding in Stromberg 
(2008) contradicts results found in Kaplan and Stromberg (2009). 
I also test if the Debt/capital ratio of the target firm has an impact on the returns 
to the investment or to the exit time of the transactions. In my results, I find that higher 
Debt/Capital ratio results in lower returns and longer time to exit. Higher leverage 
means higher risk, and especially during periods when the economy is slow or doing 
badly, this results in lower returns and losses for the LBOs.   
It is also possible, that, the industry of the PE firms (buyer firms) and that of 
their targets may influence the returns or the exit patterns of the LBO or PE returns. In 
my analysis, I find that buyer firms in the same industry as the target have higher 
returns in most cases. This is because if the Target firm and the buyer firm are from the 
same industry, they will have more knowledge about operating procedures. This might 
also be due to economies of scale from operating in the combined firm.  
 
 
15 
Section II is the hypotheses section. Section III provides a comprehensive literature 
review of all related studies of up to 2014. Section IV describes the data utilized in the 
dissertation, its limitations and the screens that I employed. Section V gives a detailed 
overview of the methodology used in the study. Section VI shows the results of the 
various types of regression and the interpretation of the results uncovered.  Section VII 
shows the conclusion and points the way for future work.  
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HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Returns of Leveraged buyouts are on average higher for LBOs in 
developed economies. However during periods of high economic growth, LBOs in 
developing economies have better returns when compared with developed economies. 
In slow or low growth rate periods, LBO transactions in developed economies produce 
higher returns than the LBOs in developing economies.  
This is true because developed economies have high growth rates in terms of 
GDP and other economic indicators. Historical GDP (last 10 years) in US is on average 
about 2%-2.5% and highest being about 6.6% in Q3 2003. Source: US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. In UK and Scotland, GDP growth rate in the last 10 years has been 
around 2% with the highest GDP being a little over 4% in Q3 2003 (UK GDP). Source: 
Scottish Government Website. 
In China (Newly industrialized economy), GDP growth rate in the last 10 years 
has been around 9% with the highest GDP being about 12.8% in 2007. South Africa 
has a highest GDP growth rate of up to 6.5%. Similar in other developing or newly 
industrialized economies, GDP growth rate is much higher compared to the developed 
economies.  
Hence investments in developing or newly industrialized economies have 
higher returns when compared to investments in developed economies. However, in 
periods of slow economic growth, like periods of recession, the developing markets are 
highly risky. Hence I want to test if Hypothesis 1 holds true. 
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Hypothesis 2: Leveraged buyouts in developing economies exit sooner on 
average.  During periods of very high economic growth, LBOs in developing 
economies exit sooner when compared with developed economies. But the results also 
show that in periods of negative economic growth, the LBOs in developing economies 
exit the soonest in order to minimize losses in recession.  
Hypothesis 2 makes sense due to the same reasoning behind Hypothesis 1. In 
periods of fast economies growth, the developing market’s LBOs have high returns and 
hence exit sooner. And in periods of recession, the LBOs in developing markets exit 
soon in order to avoid major losses in the investment. In periods of moderate economic 
growth, LBOs in developing economies take longer time periods to exit.  
I also try to find how differently the returns of the LBO are influenced by 
various other variables that are listed and described below in the model. I test how these 
factors influence the amount, returns and number of days to exit the LBOs.  
Hypothesis 3: Reputed PE firms result in higher returns of the target firm and 
takes fewer days to exit. 
This hypothesis is to test and verify the results found in previous research that 
reputed PE firms result in higher returns. Stromberg (2008) finds that LBO transactions 
that are sponsored by more experienced PE partnerships tend to stay in LBO ownership 
for a shorter period of time, are more likely to go public, and are less likely to end in 
bankruptcy or financial restructuring. Ivashina and Kovner (2011) find that bank 
relationships formed through repeated interactions reduce inefficiencies from 
information asymmetry and result in favorable loan terms for the PE firms in leveraged 
buyouts transactions.  Demiroglu and James (2010) found that reputable Private equity 
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groups pay lower loan spreads and have longer loan maturities. They also find that 
reputation is positively related to buyout leverage; Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2010), find that leverage (Debt/EBITDA) is directly related to reputation. 
Hypothesis 4: Smaller firms have higher returns when compared to large firms 
Small firms also take shorter time periods to exit when compared with larger firms. 
This hypothesis is to retest the results found in previous research. The 
hypothesis holds true because if the size of the firm is smaller, then it is easier to exit 
due to more available options of exit. It is easier to find buyers in case of secondary 
LBO or strategic sale. Demiroglu and James (2010) and Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou 
and Gottschalg (2010), find that small investments outperform large ones. 
Hypothesis 5: Club deals (LBO transactions that have more than one PE firm) 
on average result in higher returns and exit sooner until there was government scrutiny 
in 2006 and onwards, which make them take longer time to exit. Club deals in 
developing economies are not profitable but exit sooner when compared with club deals 
in developed economies.  
Hypothesis 5 makes sense because the initial LBO prices of club deals are 
depressed due to higher bargaining power of the consortium of buyers. Hence it is an 
advantage to the PE firms, which results in higher returns at the time of exit of the 
LBO.  
In developing economies, club deals lead to more problems than there are 
benefits. There could be discrepancies among the consortium of PE firms involved in 
the PE firms in the way they run the business and hence leads to lower returns.  
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Masulis and Thomas (2009) find that club deals are not all that profitable due to 
agency cost that arises out of multiple PE firms sponsoring an LBO deal. In a club deal, 
there are additional conflicts of interest between LBO sponsors. These conflicts could 
result in more agency costs in terms of free riding by some sponsoring private-equity 
firms and disagreements among others over a target company’s major policies or 
proposed policy changes, especially when a firm is performing poorly. Since club deals 
in developing economies are found to perform poorly when compared to those in 
developed economies, there are more agency problems which create further losses
4
.  
 
                                                 
4
 These conflicts could result in more agency costs in terms of free riding by some sponsoring private-equity firms and disagreements 
among others over a target company’s major policies or proposed policy changes, especially when a firm is performing poorly.  Since  
target firms in developing economies perform poorly when compared with target firms in developed markets, the agency costs are 
higher.  However, this potentially cost can be minimized by limiting the size of club deals to two or three investors, which is the norm. 
Another possible disadvantage of these syndicated LBO deals is that the future portfolio company’s stock appears to experience more 
insider trading activity prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
There have been studies that have looked at international LBOs and analyzed 
various factors that influence LBO activity. Leeds and Sunderland (2003), find that the 
returns in developing markets do not compensate for the high risk involved in the 
transactions. This is mainly due to low standards of corporate governance in terms of 
quality of information required for investment decisions, weakness in legal systems to 
enforce legal contracts and protecting all classes of investors; and the inability of 
domestic equity markets to offer reasonable exit prospects through public offering. 
They also mention that private equity investors differentiate investments between 
countries based on protection to shareholder rights, tax treatment of capital gains, and 
securities market development. 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) look at PE investments around the world. They 
broadly classify the LBO exits into strategic sale, secondary buyout, public offering and 
bankruptcy. They also find that small firms, reputed firms and syndicated firms exit 
sooner. Stromberg (2008) does a comprehensive study of LBOs across the world. They 
also look at the characteristics of LBO exits based on size, industry and other effects 
such as syndication of the PE firms.  
Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010), find that Quick flips 
(investments held for less than 2 years have high IRR (85%)) and investments held for 
more than 6 years have IRR of 8%. They also find that small investments outperform 
large ones. They look at the size of the PE firm in influencing the returns of the PE 
investment. In their paper, they also find that investments in developing countries 
exhibit poorer performance when compared to developed countries. This may be a 
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result of costly learning, lower leverage, poorer legal environments and limited exit 
routes. Lerner and Schoar (2004) also find that returns from private equity in these 
nations also appear to have been far lower than in the United States and Europe. Lerner 
and Schoar (2005) find that transactions vary with nations’ legal enforcement. They 
find that in low enforcement and civil law nations, PE groups tend to use common 
stock and debt, and rely on equity and board control. LBO transactions in high 
enforcement countries use convertible preferred stock with covenants, and they tend to 
have higher valuations and returns. 
In the paper by Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2012) they find 
that the economy-wide cost of borrowing is the main driver of both the quantity and the 
composition of debt in these buyouts. Credit conditions also have a strong effect on 
prices paid in buyouts, even after controlling for prices of equivalent public market 
companies.  In the developing markets, the acquirers are mixed. Some are international 
PE firms, some are Domestic PE or other investment firms, and there are also a few 
other firms acquiring the target companies. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) found that 
LBO activity was very active in the period of 2005 – mid-2007 due to overly favorable 
terms for debt investors during this period. The LBO activity decreased in late 2007 due 
to credit-market turmoil. Demiroglu and James (2010) found that reputable private 
equity groups are more active in the LBO market when the credit risk spreads are low 
and when lending standards in the credit market are lax.  
Masulis and Thomas (2009), club deals are not all that profitable due to agency 
cost that arises out of multiple PE firms sponsoring an LBO deal. In a club deal, there 
are additional conflicts of interest between LBO sponsors. These conflicts could result 
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in more agency costs in terms of free riding by some sponsoring private-equity firms 
and disagreements among others over a target company’s major policies or proposed 
policy changes, especially when a firm is performing poorly. However, this potential 
cost can be minimized by limiting the size of club deals to two or three investors, which 
is the norm. They also mention another possible disadvantage of these syndicated LBO 
deal, that the future portfolio company’s stock appears to experience more insider 
trading activity prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
Demiroglu and James (2010) also found that small investments perform better 
than the larger ones. They also find that leverage (Debt/EBITDA) is directly related to 
reputation. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) also find that find smaller firms 
perform better than larger firms in acquisitions.  
Crucini, Kose and Otrok (2008) find that international business cycles are 
mainly determined by productivity, measures of fiscal and financial policy, terms of 
trade and oil prices. Calderón and Fuentes (2010) find that output losses during 
peak‐to‐trough phases are larger among emerging market countries than among 
industrial ones. Output gains during trough-to-peak phases are larger among emerging 
market economies.   
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that Good law 
enforcement has effect on valuation and breadth of debt and equity markets. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) show that poor shareholder protection is 
penalized with lower valuations, and that higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling 
shareholder improves valuation, especially in countries with poor investor protection. 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) found that public credit registries, which are 
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primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in 
developing countries. 
Few of the studies have looked at the returns on the leveraged buyouts in both 
the developed and developing economies. My paper looks at returns of LBOs and exit 
pattern of the LBOs in the recession and the boom periods which none of the other 
papers have looked at so far.  
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DATA 
 
 
The LBO transaction data is collected from Capital IQ. The exit information 
was collected from Capital IQ separately and is matched with the initial LBO 
transaction based on Target company name. If exit information was not present, then a 
manual search was done to find exit information from the individual LBO company 
websites or from a general web search.  
Initially for the preliminary regression test, to test how the value of the LBO 
depends on various other factors, I include 40,886 LBO and MBO transactions that 
took place from 1980 – April 2012. Some of the LBO transactions did not have exit 
information. This could be due to various reasons such as: LBO transaction did not exit 
yet or the terms of the deal were not disclosed during the deal, or exit information not 
recorded in CapitalIQ. A huge number of transactions happened in the recent years 
(2010 onwards) and hence have not yet exited. From the available information, 15,912 
transactions or 38.91% of the transactions exited the initial LBO transactions.   
For the transactions that had an exit date; and had either the exit transaction 
value or the initial LBO transaction value, various imputation techniques were used and 
the results were roughly the same. Kofman and Sharpe (2003) explain the various 
popular imputation techniques and imputation techniques by filling in the average 
values in the missing places if one of their methods. For the regression results 
mentioned in Tables 19, 20 and 21, the missing values were imputed by using the 
average values. For transactions that had exit dates and exit transaction value (either 
originally or through imputation) regression tests was done to find the dependency of 
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the returns of the LBOs on various factors and also to find the dependence of number of 
days to exit on various factors.  
For those transactions that did not have both the initial LBO transaction value 
and the exit transaction value recorded in CapitalIQ, I eliminated them for the 
regression analysis phase. If the transactions did not have an exit transaction value and 
an exit date, such transactions were eliminated too.  
In the paper Kaplan and Strömberg (2008), they use similar data from CapitalIQ 
and found that 54% of the transactions had not yet exited. My data shows that about 
62.5% of the firms do not have exit information. My results are different since I 
consider data from 1980 to April 2012.  The time frame of study in Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2008) is from 1970 to 2007.  
The exit method is either through public offering, secondary LBO (which 
includes Management buyout), Bankruptcy sale, Strategic Sale (Trade sale) or Terms 
not disclosed. Since I treated LBOs and MBOs to have similar characteristics in the 
initial LBO screening process, they are combined to find the exit patterns. Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2009) also combine MBOs and LBOs to test the results.  
Public offering is a process of listing the firm in the stock market again so as to 
make the firm public again. Secondary LBO is a process of selling the LBO to another 
private equity firm. Strategic sale is the process of selling the LBO firm to another 
strategic buyer who is not a private equity firm. Since high amounts of debt are 
involved, some of the firms may end up in bankruptcy or reorganization. 
In my data, I find that most common routes of exit are strategic sale, secondary 
LBO and public offering. Strategic sale was 36% and Secondary LBO 28%, public 
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offering 24% of the total exits, and the number of firms that went into bankruptcy was 
9%. Stromberg (2008) find that the most common exit route, for PE and MBO deals 
alike, are trade sales to another corporation, accounting for 38% of all exits. The second 
most common exit route is secondary buyouts (24%), public offering only accounts for 
13% of exits. Since high amounts of debts involved in the transactions, about 6% of the 
transactions end up in financial distress.  
The average exit time of all the LBOs is 5.25 years. Strömberg (2008) found 
that LBOs in the 1980s take 6-7 years to exit and LBOs in the 1990s take 9 years to 
exit. Kaplan (1991) found the median leveraged-buyout target remained in private 
ownership for 6.82 years.  
For the regression process, I create various dummy variables to analyze how 
these various variables affect my dependent variables: Return and Number of days to 
exit. Detailed explanation of how these variables are created is provided in the 
methodology section. Dummy variables created: developing nations, Target firm and 
Buyer firm from the same country to see how the results vary, if target and buyer are 
from the same industry, reputed PE firm (top 50 reputed buyer firms from PEI 300), 
Small target firm, GDP above or between the benchmark levels, Exit GDP above or 
between the benchmark levels; interaction variable of developing country firm and Exit 
GDP above or between the benchmark levels. The initial GDP and exit GDP 
benchmark levels chosen are GDP< 0%, GDP between 0 to 2%, GDP between 2 to 5% 
and GDP above 5%, club deal in developing economies, club deals in developing 
economies from reputed PE firms, club deals of small firms, club deals of large firms, 
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club deals of small firms in developing economies, club deals of large firms in 
developing economies, club deals in different decades (1980 to 2012).  
Other variables: Value of the LBO deal in USD million, number of PE firms 
(club deals), percentage returns of the LBO from start to exit, number of days to exit, 
target firm market capitalization, target firm Debt/Capital ratio, GDP level during the 
LBO transaction, GDP level at the time of exit of the LBO, Law enforcement in target 
country, government effectiveness in target country, number of procedures to start a 
business in target country.  
Table 1: Table shows number of LBO and MBO transactions in each decade (from the 
data initially collected from CapitalIQ).  
      
Time period Number of 
LBO/MBO 
transactions 
Percentage of LBO 
and MBO 
transactions 
1980 – 
1989 
554 1.3554% 
1990 – 
1999 
3,713 9.081% 
2000 – 
2009 
28,351 69.3416% 
2010 – 
2012 
8,268 20.222% 
Total 40,886   
 
 
Table 1 shows that, most of the LBO transactions happened in the 2000s. From 
the above capital IQ data, I find that 1.4% of the transactions were in the 1980s, 9% of 
the LBOs are in the 1990s, 69% of the transactions were from 2000s and 20% of the 
transactions were 2010-2012. 
In table 2, panel A, using the available LBO transactions that had transaction 
value recorded in CapitalIQ, I sort the transactions according to the decade in which the 
transactions happened. In 1980s the total value of the transactions was 131 million 
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USD; in 1990s the total value of the LBO transactions was 463 million USD. From the 
year 2000-2009 the transaction value was 3.94 Billion USD, from 2010 – 2012, the 
transaction value was 473 million. This shows that a huge number of transactions and 
large deals happened from 2000 onwards. 
Table 2: Table shows values of LBO and MBO transactions with transaction value 
information available in CapitalIQ 
        
Panel A       
Time period 
Number of LBO/MBO 
transactions 
Percentage of LBO and 
MBO transactions 
Total 
Transaction 
value (Millions 
of $) 
1980 – 
1989 
275 1.73% 131,007.79 
1990 – 
1999 
1,870 11.75% 462,616.39 
2000 – 
2009 
11,138 70% 3,936,758.49 
2010 – 
2012 
2,629 16.52% 472,706.35 
Total 15,912   5,003,089.02 
Panel B       
Year 
    
Transaction 
value, MM 
USD  
2009   52,641.10 
2008   39,769.49 
2007   129,750.91 
2006   183,417.64 
2005   111,969.07 
2004   74,692.88 
2003   61,318.27 
2002   76,518.44 
2001   35,260.17 
2000     26,618.42 
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Panel B of table 2 shows the number of transactions from the year 2000 to 2009. The 
same values are used in figure 1 to show a chart of the number of transactions in 2000 
to 2009 time period. From the time period 2000 to 2007 the number of LBOs and total 
transaction value of LBOs increased steadily and dropped suddenly in 2008 and 2009 
due to the recession. The number of transactions increased in the year 2010 after the 
economy showed signs of improvement (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Figure shows transaction amounts of LBOs from 2000 - 2010 
 
Table 3 shows the number and value of transactions of developed economies sorted 
according to the decade in which the LBO transaction took place. Number of LBO 
transactions and total transaction value of LBO transactions are higher from year 2000. 
10,009 transactions took place between 2000 and 2009 with a total transaction value of 
3.86 Million. CapitalIQ had 265 transactions recorded in the time period 1980 to 1989.  
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Table 3: Number of LBO/MBO transactions and total value of transactions in 
developed economies 
Time 
period 
Number of LBO/ MBO 
transactions 
Percentage of total 
number of LBO/ 
MBO transactions 
Total 
Transaction 
value, MM 
USD 
1980 – 
1989 
265 1.87% 130,061.49 
1990 – 
1999 
1,818 12.84% 457,767.79 
2000 – 
2009 
10,009 70.67% 3,860,883.79 
2010 – 
2012 
2071 14.62% 445,419.65 
Total 14,163   4,894,132.72 
 
 
Table 4: Number of LBO and MBO transactions and total value of transactions in 
developing economies 
    
Time period 
Number of LBO/ MBO 
transactions 
Percentage of total 
number of LBO/ 
MBO transactions 
Total 
Transaction 
value, MM 
USD 
1980 – 
1989 
0 0.00% 0.00 
1990 – 
1999 
52 2.97% 4,848.60 
2000 – 
2009 
1,129 64.55% 75,874.70 
2010 – 
2012 
558 31.91% 27,286.70 
Total 1,739   108,010.00 
 
 
Among the firms that had transaction amount information (15,912 variables), about 
1,749 (11%) of target firms involved in the LBO or MBO were from developing 
nations and newly industrialized nations. Table 4 shows the number and value of 
transactions in developing economies sorted according to the decade in which the LBO 
transaction took place. Number of transactions in developing economy during the 1980 
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to 1989 time period is zero, but however, Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) found the same 
in their data (table 1). This is probably due to missing transactions in CapitalIQ. 
Number of LBO transactions and total transaction value of LBO transactions are higher 
from year 2000. I also notice that there is a big increase in the number of LBOs from 
2010 – 2012. This shows that after the recession in 2008 there were more investors in 
the developing markets since they expected a huge increase in returns from those 
investments. Total transaction value of all the LBO and MBO transactions in 
developing countries are 108,010 million USD. Where as total transaction value of 
developed economies: 4,894,133 Million USD (table 3).  
Sorting the transactions based on how many target firms in developed (and 
developing) countries have buyers from developed countries and how many of the 
buyers are from developing markets, I find that among the 14,163 LBO and MBO 
transactions in developed countries, only 101 transactions were from a buyer in 
developing country. Whereas among the 1,739 LBO and MBO transactions in 
developing countries, 318 transactions were dome by a PE firm from a developing 
country. A large number of the LBO/MBO transactions in developing countries were 
carried out by PE firms from developed countries. 56 LBO/MBO transactions in 
developing countries were from reputed PE firms in developed countries.  
This data consists of observations from 48 different countries, both developed 
and developing. The countries in which the LBOs are recorded are: United States of 
America, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Ireland, Spain, Poland, Mexico, Australia, 
Sweden, Finland, South Africa, Argentina, Italy, Norway, Israel, Hong Kong, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Barbados, Germany, Brazil, New Zealand, Georgia, 
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Belgium, China, Malaysia, India, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Austria, Japan, Bermuda, Jordan, Russia, Estonia, Channel Island, Indonesia, 
Ghana, South Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Denmark, Thailand and Sri Lanka.   
In table 5, I look at the number and percentage of LBO transactions according to 
type of exit. This table also shows the percentage of exits and number of transactions in 
developing economies too. The average exit time period of all the transactions is 5.25 
years. The most common route of exit is Strategic Sale. Strategic sale was 36% of the 
total transactions; Secondary buyout 28% (Secondary LBO + Management buyout) and 
public offering 24% of the total exits. There was also a significant amount of 
bankruptcy (9%). When I look at the exit patterns in developing economies, I see that 
the most common exit route is again strategic sale being 44%, public offering accounts 
for 15%, Secondary buyout and management buyout account for about 7.34% of the 
total exits in developing economies and bankruptcy accounts for 4.44%.  
 
Table 5: Sorting the LBO transactions according to the type of exit.  
     
Type of Exit 
Developed and 
Developing 
Percentage Developing 
Percentage of 
Total Exits 
Public 
Offering 
1,432 24.50% 50 14.79% 
Secondary 
LBO 
1,371 23.45% 14 4.14% 
Management 
buyout 
264 4.51% 11 3.25% 
Strategic 
Sale 
2,096 35.85% 148 43.79% 
Bankruptcy 
Sale 
521 8.91% 15 4.44% 
Total 5,846   338   
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Table 6: Sorting the LBO transactions according to the time period of exit.  
   
Time of 
Exit 
Number of LBOs 
exited 
Percentage 
1980-1989 12 0.20% 
1990-1999 412 7.05% 
2000-2009 3,784 64.73% 
2010-2012 1,638 28.02% 
Total 5,846   
 
 
Comparing table 1 and table 6, I observe that the percentage of LBOs in table 1 
and the percentage of exits in each decade are nearly same. About 1.35% of the LBOs 
took place in the 1980-1989 time period (table 1) and about 0.2% of the LBOs exited 
during this period (table 6). In 1990 – 1999 time period, 9.08% of total LBOs took 
place; And the number of exits during the 1990 – 1999 time period were 7.05%. In 
2000 – 2009 time period, 69.3% LBOs took place and 64.73% of the total exited LBOs, 
exited during this period.  In the time period 2010 – 2012, 20.22% of LBO transactions 
took place and 28.02% of total exits were during this period. Hence as mentioned in 
Greene (2011), if the data is unavailable and it does not affect efficiency, I can ignore 
the missing data on exits. The data available on exits is almost the same percentage as 
the percentage of LBOs in each period and hence the exit data seems to be a true 
representation of the entire sample.  
In order to measure returns on “club deals” (LBOs with two or more PE firms) a 
dummy variable is created for club deals. The transactions that have more than one PE 
firms are given a value of “one” and if the LBO transaction has only one PE firm 
involved in the transaction, then a value of “zero” is given to the transaction.  
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 From the data I see that 24.2% of the LBO transactions are club deals and the rest 
are non-club deals (There are a total of 1,417 club deals out of the total 5,846 LBO 
transactions that we use for regression). Among the 1,417 transactions that are club 
deals, 438 of the club deals have at-least one reputed PE firm which is about 30% of the 
club deals. Among the 1,417 club deals, 1,392 transactions were from developed 
countries and only the remaining 25 transactions are from developing countries. This 
shows that club deals are not so common in developing countries.  
The average transactions size of club deals in developed market is 633.44 
Million USD (average size of all firms in developed countries is 392.08 Million USD) , 
where as in the developing markets, the average size of club deals is 227.68 Million 
USD (average size of all firms in developing countries is 82.72 Million USD). This 
shows that club deals are very large compared to all other deals.   
Table 7: Number of club deals sorted by each decade (both developing and 
developed economies) 
     
Initial LBO 
time period 
Number of Club deals 
Percentage 
of club 
deals 
Number of 
club deals 
in 
developing 
countries 
Number of 
club deals in 
developed 
countries 
1980-1989 60 4.23% 0 60 
1990-1999 574 40.51% 3 571 
2000-2009 780 55.05% 22 758 
2010-2012 3 0.21% 0 3 
Total 1,417   25 1,392 
 
The average number of PE firms in a club deal is 2.49. Most of the club deals 
have 2 or 3 PE firms. Average number of PE firms in a club deal in developed country 
is 2.49 and the average number of PE firms in developing countries is 2.48. The 
number of PE firms in an LBO transaction range from at least one firm to a maximum 
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of eight PE firms. When there are two or more PE firms the transaction qualifies as a 
club deal. An average of 2.49 shows that majority of deals had either 2 or 3 PE firms.  
Table 7 looks at LBO transactions according to the time period in which they 
initially took place. From table 7, I see that club deals were more prominent from 1990 
onwards and are highest in 2000- 2009. There were a total of 60 club deal transactions 
in 1980 – 1989 time period. 574 club deal transactions took place in 1990 – 1999 time 
period and 780 transactions took place in 2000 – 2009 time period. After 2009, there 
have been just 3 club deals. This finding is consistent with the findings in Officer 
(2010) where they find that club deals reduced after 2006 since there was higher 
government scrutiny about the motive behind the formation of a club.  
Table 8: Number of transactions, transaction size and “time to exit” for non-club 
deals (one PE firm) and club deals (two to eight PE firms).  
    
Number of 
PE firms  
Number of LBO 
transactions 
Average 
Transaction 
value, MM 
USD 
Time to 
exit, days 
1 4,314 283.00 1,859 
2 969 341.00 2,062 
3 313 941.00 2,193 
4 65 1,112.00 2,377 
5 38 1,997.00 2,044 
6 23 2,140.00 1,976 
7 8 1,354.00 1,938 
8 1 11,536.00 2,336 
Total 5,846   1,915 
 
 
 In table 8 when the number of PE firms = 1, then this transaction is a non-
club deal which involves a single PE firm that is involved in the LBO transaction. 
When the number of PE firms is “2” that means there are two PE firms involved in the 
LBO transaction hence it is a club deal. Similarly when number of PE firms is 3 to 8 
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these are club deals involving the respective number of PE firms involved in the LBO 
transaction process.  
From Table 8, it is evident that single private equity firm LBO transactions (non-
club deals) is the most common type of transaction. 4,314 transactions out of the total 
sample of 5,846 transactions are non-club deals. Only 1,417 transactions (24% of the 
total transactions) are club deals, which involve two or more PE firms. Club deals are 
uncommon as compared to the single PE firm deals. Among the club deal transactions, 
transactions with two PE firms are the most common. 969 transactions had just 2 PE 
firms involved in the transaction. The number of LBO transactions reduces as the 
number of PE firms increases. 313 transactions had 3 PE firms involved in the deal. 65 
transactions had 4 PE firms and 38 firms had 5 PE firms. 23 transactions had 6 PE 
firms, 8 transactions had 7 PE firms and only one transaction had 8 PE firms. This 
shows that generally club deals involve two or three PE firms involved in the 
transaction. Hence the average number of club deals is around 2.49.  
Figure 2 shows graphical representation of the number of transactions involved 
in non-club deals (one PE firm) and club deals (two or more PE firms). Figure 3 and 
table 8 show average transaction size of club deals and non-club deals. On average, the 
transaction size increases as the number of PE firms involved in the transaction 
increases. When there is one PE firm involved in the transaction, the average 
transaction size is $283 Million USD.  The average transaction size of the 969 
transactions, when there are two PE firms involved in the transaction is $341 Million 
USD. When there are three PE firms involved in the transaction, then the average 
transaction size is 941 Million USD. And when there are four PE firms involves in the 
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LBO transaction, the average transaction size is 1,112 Million USD. When the number 
of PE firms are 5,6,7 and 8, the average transaction sizes are 1,997 Million USD, 2,140 
Million USD, 1,354 Million USD and 11,536 Million USD. However the number of 
transactions when there 5 or higher number of PE firms is significantly low. 
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Figure 2: Number of LBO transactions in non-club deals (one PE firm) and club 
deals (two or more PE firms) 
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Figure 3: Average transaction size in Million USD for non-club deals (one PE 
firm) and club deals (two or more PE firms).  
 
In figure 3, it can be seen that the average transaction size is large when there 
are more PE firms involved in the transactions. This shows that large targets are 
generally involved in a club deal and as the size of the club deal increases, more 
number of PE firms are required to join together to bid for the target firm. This in-turn 
reduces competition and hence results in lower returns at the time of exit.  
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Figure 4: Number of days to exit for non-club deals (one PE firm) and club 
deals (two or more PE firms) 
 
Figure 4 and table 8 show that club deals take longer time to exit. Figure 4 plots 
the number of days it takes for the LBOs to exit when there are one to eight PE firms. 
And it is evident that when there is one PE firm involved in the transaction, the LBO 
exits sooner and as the number of PE firms increases, the number of days it takes to exit 
the LBO increases in general. However if there are higher than 4 PE firms, the number 
of such LBO transactions are less in number and hence they do not significantly impact 
the data.  These results are however skewed since from tables 12 and 15, it is evident 
that club deals exit sooner in most of the time periods. In the last few years, 2008 and 
later, there have been very few club deals. Where as there were many non-club deals 
which exited soon.  
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Table 9: Average time to exit the transactions based on their initial transaction time 
period (both developed and developing economies).  
Years Number of 
transactions 
Average 
time to 
exit 
Number of 
transactions 
in developed 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
(developed) 
Number of 
transactions 
in 
developing 
Average time 
to exit in days 
(developing) 
1980-
1989 
198 
4880 
days 
198 
4880 
days 
0  
1990-
1999 
1,805 
2740 
days 
1,767 
3739 
days 
38 2,781 days 
2000-
2009 
3,742 
1406 
days 
3,486 
1421 
days 
256 1,195 days 
2010-
2012 
101 
257 
days 
57 288 days 44 217 days 
Total 5,846 
1915 
days 
5,508 
1957 
days 
338 1,241 days 
 
 
Table 9 shows average time the LBO firms take to exit. The table also sorts the 
number of transactions and average time to exit the LBO based on if the target firm is 
from developed economy or from developing economy. The LBO exits are sorted 
according the time period in which the LBOs exit. From the average time to exit in 
table 9, it is evident that LBO transactions in 1980s took longer time to exit when 
compared to LBOs in 1990s and the 2000s. In the 1980s LBO transactions took 4880 
days or about 13.3 years to exit. Whereas in the 1990s time period, LBO transactions 
took 2740 days or 7.5 years to exit. The reason for shorter exit time periods in 2000s 
(1406 days in 2000 - 2009 and 257 days in 2010 - 2012) is because the data sample 
includes transactions only until 2012. Some of the transactions that took place after the 
year 2000 may still not have exited until our data collection date.  
In table 9, when the average time to exit is sorter based on if the target firm 
belonged to the developed or developing economies, it is evident that the LBOs in 
developing economies exit sooner when compared to LBOs in developed economies. In 
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the time period 1990-1999 LBOs in developed economies took about 3739 days (10.24 
years) to exit on average and LBOs in developing economies took 2781 days (7.62 
years) to exit. Similar pattern is noticed even after the year 2000 and later, LBOs in 
developing economies exit sooner that LBOs in developed economies in each time 
period. This is because, LBO transactions in developing economies during high 
economic growth periods have high returns when compared to developed economies 
and hence the PE  firms may want to exit sooner and lock in the profits or due to the 
fact that LBOs transactions in developing economies involve smaller firms and hence 
exit sooner.  
Figure 5 is a graphical representation of values in table 9. The figure shows 
average time to exit (days) for transactions in various decades starting from 1980 to 
2012. From figure 5, it can be seen that the average number of days to exit is decreasing 
drastically in recent time periods. This could be either because of increasing experience 
of the PE firms in the field which makes them easily exit the transaction; or it could be 
the case that some of the LBOs did not exit before 2012 and hence we do not have the 
data yet.  
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Figure 5: A comparison of average time to exit in days for LBO transactions in 
each decade from 1980 to 2012.  
 
 
Table 10: Average exit time of club deals 
       
Years 
# of 
transacti
ons 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
Number of 
transactions 
in 
developed 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
(developed) 
Number of 
transactions 
in 
developing 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
(developing) 
1980-
1989 
60 4,638 days 60 4,638 days 0  
1990-
1999 
574 2,668 days 571 2,665 days 3 3,169 days 
2000-
2009 
780 1,499 days 758 1,493 days 22 1,714 days 
2010-
2012 
3 3,69 days 3 369 days 0   
Total 1,417 2,103 days 1392 2,107 days 25 1,889 days 
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Figure 6: A comparison of average time to exit in days of club deals in each decade 
from 1980 to 2012.  
 
Table 10 shows average number of days to exit for club deals only (where there 
are two or more PE firms involved in the LBO transactions). Even in case of club deals, 
it can be seen from table 10 that the transactions in 1980s take longer time to exit. 
Between 1980 to 1989 the club deals take 4,638 days (12.7 years to exit). Between the 
time period 1990 to 1999, club deals take 2,668 days to exit (7.3 years). And after the 
year 2000 and later, club deals take much lesser time to exit compared to previous time 
periods.  
Club deals in developing economies took shorter time periods to exit when 
compared to club deals in developed economies. In the developed economies, club 
deals took 2,107 days on average and in developing economies, club deals took 1,889 
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days on average. However there are just 25 club deals transactions in developing 
economies. 
Figure 6 shows graphical comparison of average time to exit of club deals by 
each decade from 1980 to 2012. It can be seen that club deals take longer time to exit in 
1980s and the average time to exit decreases in more recent years.  
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Figure 7: A comparison of average time to exit in days between non-club deals 
and club deals in each decade from 1980 to 2012. (light blue bar chart represents non-
club deal and dark blue bar chart represents club deals) 
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Table 11 compares average exit time of non-club deals and club deals. The 
transactions are sorted according to the time period in which the initial LBO 
transactions took place. 
Table 11: Comparison of Average exit time of non-club deals and club deals 
     
Years 
# of 
transactions 
(non-club 
deals) 
Average time 
to exit (non-
club deals) 
# of 
transactions 
(Club deals) 
Average time to 
exit in days 
(club deals) 
1980-
1989 
138 4,985 days 60 4,638 days 
1990-
1999 
1,231 2,774 days 574 2,668 days 
2000-
2009 
2,962 1,381 days 780 1,499 days 
2010-
2012 
98 254 days 3 369 days 
Total 4,429 1,855 days 1,417 2,103 days 
 
Figure 7 compares the average time to exit between non-club deals and club 
deals. From table 11 and figure 7, it can be seen that in the time period between 1980 to 
1989 and also between 1990 to 1999, club deals exit sooner when compared with non-
club deals.  
In the later time periods, i.e, year 2000 and later, non-club deals exit sooner than 
club deals. This is probably due to recession in 2008 which made the difference in 
patterns of exit from previous time periods or it could be because of higher level 
monitoring from the government about the motive behind club deals after the year 2005 
as mentioned in Officer (2010). Higher government monitoring reduced the number of 
club deals (in 2010 and later years, there are just three club deals) and also makes it 
difficult for the club deals to exit the transactions.  
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Table 12: Average exit time based on type of exit and time period of the transaction 
Years Type of exit 
# of 
transactions 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
1980-
1989 
Public Offering 89 5,638 days 
 Secondary LBO 30 5,550 days 
 Management buyout 13 4,429 days 
 Strategic Sale 53 3,540 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 3 5,820 days 
1990-
1999 
Public Offering 856 2,672 days 
 Secondary LBO 252 3,206 days 
 Management buyout 133 2,161 days 
 Strategic Sale 456 2,684 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 68 3,415 days 
2000-
2009 
Public Offering 483 1,507 days 
 Secondary LBO 1,087 1,508 days 
 Management buyout 117 1,149 days 
 Strategic Sale 1,515 1,340 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 438 1,351 days 
2010-
2013 
Public Offering 4 386 days 
 Secondary LBO 2 100 days 
 Management buyout 1 146 days 
 Strategic Sale 72 249 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 12 323 days 
Total Public Offering 1,432 2,457 days 
 Secondary LBO 1,371 1,906 days 
 Management buyout 264 1,817 days 
 Strategic Sale 2,096 1,658 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 521 1,622 days 
 
Table 12 gives a break down of LBO transactions based on their type of exit and 
the time period in which the initial LBO transaction took place. The different types of 
exits are public offering, secondary LBO and management buyout, strategic sale and 
bankruptcy sale.  
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It can be seen that on average public offering takes longer times to exit through 
public offering (2,457 days or 6.73 years) due to lengthy procedures and compliances 
with the exchanges to do so. Strategic sale and bankruptcy take relatively shorter time 
periods to exit. Strategic sale takes 1,658 days or 4.54 years to exit; and bankruptcy sale 
takes 1622 days or 4.44 years to exit. Secondary LBO and management buyout takes 
1,906 and 1,817 days respectively which is 5.022 years and 4.98 years respectively. 
This shows that it is quicker to exit through strategic sale and Secondary LBO 
(including MBO).  
 
When the exit methods are sorted based on the time period of the initial 
transactions, it can be seen that in the time period 1980 – 1989, strategic sale takes the 
shortest time to exit (3,540 days or 9.70 years to exit) since it is easier to buy trade 
partners when compared to other types of exits. Public offerings take longer time to exit 
(5,638 days or 15.45 years to exit) due to the requirement to comply to exchange rules 
and long procedures to take the firm public. Secondary LBO and management buyouts 
also take long time periods to exit (5,550 and 4,429 days respectively) since it might be 
difficult to buy a new PE firm to buy the target firm in a secondary LBO transaction. 
Bankruptcy sale takes the longest time to exit (5,820 days) indicating that not many 
firms went into quick bankruptcy during that periods since the markets were quite 
stable compared to the recession in 2008/2009 time period.  
In the time period 1990 to 1999, in general most of the types of exits take 
shorter time periods to exit compared to the previous decade (1980 to 1989). In the 
1980s the boom of LBOs was by using junk bonds and hence there was a bust in LBO 
during the recession in early 1990s. Beginning in 1992, the LBO market started to 
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boom once again until the 2000s. This tremendous growth and greater experience of 
large PE firms lead to quick exit of LBOs 
After the year 2000, LBOs have had tremendous growth once again until the 
recession in the years 2008/2009. The table shows that LBOs from the year 2000 exited 
very quickly on average. But this data can be skewed since some of the LBOs in this 
period may not yet have exited. The data set for this study includes LBOs until 2012 
and hence there is a possibility that a large number of LBOs did not exit yet. The LBOs 
that exited so far in the 2000s exited soon and the LBOs that take a long time to exit in 
future are not yet considered in the sample.  
Table 13 looks at the average exit time in developed economies based on if the 
exit method was through public offering, secondary LBO, management buyout, 
strategic sale or bankruptcy. The exit information is also sorted based on the time 
period in which the initial LBO transaction took place. From the table it can be seen 
that strategic sale is the most common exit method (1,948 transactions) on average. 
Secondary LBO and management buyout combined is the second most common type of 
exit method, where there are 1,357 transactions that exited through secondary LBO and 
253 transactions that exited through management buyout. Public offering is also quite 
common in the developed economies where there are 1,382 transactions in the sample 
that is considered for the study.  
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Table 13: Average exit time based on type of exit and time period of the transactions in 
developed economies 
Years Type of exit 
# of 
transactions 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
1980-
1989 
Public Offering 89 5,638 days 
 Secondary LBO 30 5,550 days 
 Management buyout 13 4,429 days 
 Strategic Sale 54 3,540 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 3 5,820 days 
1990-
1999 
Public Offering 845 2,667 days 
 Secondary LBO 251 3,202 days 
 Management buyout 130 2,175 days 
 Strategic Sale 440 2,681 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 68 3,415 days 
2000-
2009 
Public Offering 445 1,527 days 
 Secondary LBO 1,074 1,501 days 
 Management buyout 109 1,158 days 
 Strategic Sale 1,423 1,366 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 425 1,363 days 
2010-
2013 
Public Offering 3 501 days 
 Secondary LBO 2 100 days 
 Management buyout 1 46 days 
 Strategic Sale 31 284 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 10 310 days 
Total Public Offering 1,382 2,486 days 
 Secondary LBO 1,357 1,903 days 
 Management buyout 253 1,844 days 
 Strategic Sale 1,948 1,722 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 506 1,644 days 
 
Strategic sale on average took 1,722 days (4.72 years) to exit. Bankruptcies on 
average also took place quite soon after the initial LBO transactions. This is mainly due 
to the high number of bankruptcies in the 2000-2009 time period. The firms went into 
bankruptcy soon during the recession period. Public offering on average took a long 
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time to exit (2,486 days or 6.81 years on average) due to the long procedures involved 
in taking the firm public. Strategic sale and management buyouts took 1,903 days and 
1,844 days to exit respectively (5.21 years and 5.05 years respectively).  
When the LBO transactions are sorted based on the time period, from table 13, 
it can be seen that the transactions that occurred in 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 time 
periods had greater numbers of exit information. In the time period 1980 to 1989 and 
also between 1990 and 1999, public offering was the most common exit route. The 
number of public offerings reduced during the period 2000 to 2009 and later. This is 
probably because of the recession in 2008. Strategic sale exit method was more 
common after the year 2000. Also the number of bankruptcies increased significantly 
(425 bankruptcies) between the time 2000 to 2009 due to the recession in that time 
period. Bankruptcies during other time periods were relatively low.  
In the 1980s all exit methods took longer time periods to exit. Where as in the 
1990s they took relatively shorter time to exit when compared to the previous decade. 
This is because of the boom of LBOs after 1992 and also the PE firms that were 
prominent then survived the recession in early 1990s and were more experienced in 
LBO area. After the year 2000, the exit periods reduced even more, this could be again 
experience of the PE firms to exit the LBO transactions quickly. It could also be the 
fact that lot of these transactions are relatively new and may not yet have exit 
information.  
Table 14 shows number of transactions and average exit time period in days for 
all LBOs that occurred in developing countries. On average the number of LBO 
transactions are less in developing economies. The CapitalIQ database does not have 
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any information of LBO transaction’s exits during the 1980s time period. However this 
result is consistent with Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) who also recorded zero 
transactions during the 1980s. 
From table 14, in the time period between 1990 to 1999, there are few 
transactions that had exit information. Among the transactions there is only one 
secondary LBO exit which results in average exit time of 4,329 days. Since there is 
only one transaction, we cannot generalize the results on secondary LBO exit. 17 firms 
exited through strategic sale and the average exit time period is 2,744 days (7.52 years). 
Exits through public offering resulted in average exit time of 3,045 days (8.34 years on 
average).  
Most of the transactions in the developing economies that exited were the LBO 
transactions that occurred in the 2000 to 2009 time period. Most of the transactions that 
took place in this time period exited through strategic sale method (96 transactions 
exited through strategic sale method with an average exit time of 1,139 days in 2000-
2009). Also during this time period, there are 13 bankruptcies. These are a result of 
recession during the 2008 time period.  
In the time period 2010 to 2012, there are mostly strategic sale exits (35 of the 
transactions exited through strategic sale). There are two bankruptcies and one public 
offering exits. The number of days these transactions took to exit is lower. This is 
because the LBO transactions are really new and most of the transactions during this 
period have not yet exited.  
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Table 14: Average exit time based on type of exit and time period of the transactions in 
developing economies. 
Years Type of exit 
# of 
transactions 
Average time 
to exit in days 
1980-
1989 
Public Offering 0  
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 0  
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
1990-
1999 
Public Offering 11 3,045 days 
 Secondary LBO 1 4,329 days 
 Management buyout 3 1,569 days 
 Strategic Sale 17 2,744 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
2000-
2009 
Public Offering 38 1,275 days 
 Secondary LBO 13 2,071 days 
 Management buyout 8 1,018 days 
 Strategic Sale 96 1,139 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 13 975 days 
2010-
2013 
Public Offering 1 40 days 
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 35 213 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 2 386 days 
Total Public Offering 50 1,640 days 
 Secondary LBO 14 2,232 days 
 Management buyout 11 1,168 days 
 Strategic Sale 148 1,129 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 15 896 days 
 
Table 15 shows average number of days to exit the LBO transactions and 
number of transactions of club deals sorted based on the time period in which the 
transactions took place initially. Among the club deal transactions, most of the club 
deals exited in the 1990s which is different from information that was shown in tables 
13, 14 and 15. There there were fewer transactions in 1990 as compared to the 2000s. 
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Club deals on the other hand were more prominent in 1990s. In the time period 2000, 
there are fewer club deal exits since there was higher government intervention on the 
motive of club deals during this period (Officer, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010)). Higher 
government intervention lead to lesser number of club deals that and hence fewer exits 
during the time period 2000 and later.   
In table 15, among the club deal exits, there were more bankruptcies (46 
transactions) in the 2000 to 2009 time period. Also in the 1990s time period there are 
22 bankruptcies. This is probably because of the recession in the early 1990s as well as 
the recession in 2008 time period.  
The number of transactions that exited through public offering were more 
common in the LBOs that took place in the 1990s and strategic sale and secondary 
LBOs are more common in 2000s. The public offering method of exit was more 
common in club deals in 1990s due to the joint experience and reputation of the PE 
firms involved in the club deal which make public offering a little more easier when 
compared to when where is just one PE firm in the LBO transaction.  
There are a total of 3 exit transactions in the time period 2010 to 2012 (two 
strategic sales and one public offering exit). 
On average club deals take shorter time periods to exit when compared to all 
other transactions. Public offering takes 2,341 days on average (6.41 years). Secondary 
LBO and management buyouts take 2,032 and 1,924 days to exit. Strategic sale method 
takes relatively shorter time to exit (1,878 days or 5.14 years) to exit. Also the number 
and total percentage of bankruptcies are lesser when it is a club deal. There are a total 
of 69 bankruptcies which is low compared to single PE firm involved transactions.  
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Table 15: Average exit time of club deals based on type of exit and time period of the 
transaction.  
Years Type of exit 
# of 
transactions 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
1980-
1989 
Public Offering 43 4,643 days 
 Secondary LBO 7 6,341 days 
 Management buyout 1 4,680 days 
 Strategic Sale 8 3,289 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
1990-
1999 
Public Offering 287 2,540 days 
 Secondary LBO 89 3,093 days 
 Management buyout 40 2,310 days 
 Strategic Sale 122 2,588 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 22 3,760 days 
2000-
2009 
Public Offering 172 1,446 days 
 Secondary LBO 271 1,571 days 
 Management buyout 26 1,224 days 
 Strategic Sale 240 1,475 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 46 1,562 days 
2010-
2012 
Public Offering 1 278 days 
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 2 414 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 0   
Total Public Offering 503 2,341 days 
 Secondary LBO 367 2,032 days 
 Management buyout 67 1,924 days 
 Strategic Sale 372 1,878 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 69 2,274 days 
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Table 16: average exit time of club deals based on type of exit and time period of the 
transactions in developed economies. 
Years Type of exit 
# of 
transactions 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
1980-
1989 
Public Offering 43 4,643 days 
 Secondary LBO 7 5,649 days 
 Management buyout 1 4,680 days 
 Strategic Sale 8 3,289 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
1990-
1999 
Public Offering 286 2,538 days 
 Secondary LBO 89 3,093 days 
 Management buyout 40 2,310 days 
 Strategic Sale 121 2,581 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 22 3,760 days 
2000-
2009 
Public Offering 169 1,452 days 
 Secondary LBO 265 1,542 days 
 Management buyout 25 1,226 days 
 Strategic Sale 232 1,483 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 46 1,562 days 
2010-
2013 
Public Offering 1 278 days 
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 0  
  Bankruptcy Sale 0   
Total Public Offering 499 2,347 days 
 Secondary LBO 361 2,017 days 
 Management buyout 66 1,935 days 
 Strategic Sale 361 1,888 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 68 2,274 days 
 
 
Table 16 looks at club deal exit information based on type of exit, and sorted 
according to the time period in which the initial LBO transaction took place. However 
these transactions belong only to the developed economies. Most of the exits of the club 
deal transactions in developed economies took place in the 1990s and early 2000s time 
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period. There is just one transaction that took place after 2010 and had exit information 
(public offering method of exit).  
 
Table 17: average exit time of club deals based on type of exit and time period of the 
transactions in developing economies. 
Years Type of exit 
# of 
transactions 
Average 
time to exit 
in days 
1980-
1989 
Public Offering 0  
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 0  
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
1990-
1999 
Public Offering 1 3,327 days 
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 1 4,440 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
2000-
2009 
Public Offering 3 1,127 days 
 Secondary LBO 6 2,869 days 
 Management buyout 1 1,180 days 
 Strategic Sale 10 1,328 days 
 Bankruptcy Sale 0  
2010-
2013 
Public Offering 0  
 Secondary LBO 0  
 Management buyout 0  
 Strategic Sale 0  
  Bankruptcy Sale 0   
Total Public Offering 4 1,677 days 
 Secondary LBO 6 2,869 days 
 Management buyout 1 1,180 days 
 Strategic Sale 11 1,580 days 
  Bankruptcy Sale 0   
 
From table 17, it can be seen that there are very few club deal transactions in the 
developing economies. Most of the club deals transactions were from developed 
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economies. There are a total of 25 transactions in developing economies. 4 of the club 
deals transaction exited through public offering, 6 transactions exited through 
secondary buyout, one transaction through management buyout and one transaction 
through strategic sale. Four of the exits did not disclose terms. Most of the club deal 
transactions in developing economies exited through strategic sale method.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In order to prove the following five Hypotheses, I conduct a simple OLS 
regression using returns or Number of days to exit as the dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 1: Returns of leveraged buyouts are on average higher for LBOs in 
developed economies; however during periods of high economic growth, LBOs in 
developing economies have better returns when compared with developed economies. 
However in slow or low economies growth periods, the LBO transactions in developed 
economies produce higher returns than the LBOs in developing economies.  
Hypothesis 2: Leveraged buyouts in developing economies exit sooner on 
average.  During periods of very high economic growth, LBOs in developing 
economies exit sooner when compared with developed economies. The results also 
show that in periods of negative economic growth, the LBOs in developing economies 
exit the soonest in order to minimize losses in recession.  
Hypothesis 3: Reputed PE firms result in higher returns of the target firm and take 
fewer days to exit. 
Hypothesis 4: Smaller firms have higher returns when compared to large firms 
Small firms also take shorter time periods to exit when compared with larger firms.  
Hypothesis 5: Club deals (LBO transactions that have more than one PE firm) 
result in higher returns and exit sooner until there was government scrutiny after 2006. 
Club deals in developing economies exit sooner but are not profitable.  
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Model 
For the regression analysis, I use simple OLS regression models: Equation (1) is 
the initial regression equation which considered all the observations (with or without 
exit information). For Equations (2) and (3) I consider only the observations that have 
exited the initial LBO transaction. Equation (1) uses Value of the LBO as the dependent 
variables and analyzes how the value of the LBO is influenced by various factors. In 
Equation (2), the dependent variable is Annualized return of the LBO. I look at how the 
various parameters influence returns of the LBOs. Equation (3) looks at how various 
factors influence the time period to exit the LBO. 
 
Regression equations: 
1) Value of transaction (USD MM) = Developing + Reputed + Same Country + 
Same Industry + Number of PE firms + GDP + GDP benchmark levels at the time of 
initial LBO + Target Debt/Capital ratio 
 
2) Return = Days to exit + Quick flips  + Reputed + Developing + Same Country + 
Same Industry + Number of PE firms + Small firm + Type of exit + GDP + GDP at exit 
+ GDP at the time of initial LBO between 2% to 5% + GDP benchmarks at the time of 
initial LBO + GDP benchmarks at the time of exit between + Developing * GDP 
benchmarks at the time of initial LBO + Developing * GDP benchmarks at the time of 
exit  + Govt. effectiveness + Rule Law + # of procedures + Target Debt/Capital Ratio 
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3) Days to exit = Return + Quick flips  + Reputed + Developing + Same Country + 
Same Industry + Number of PE firms + Small firm + Type of exit + GDP + GDP at exit 
+ GDP at the time of initial LBO between 2% to 5% + GDP benchmarks at the time of 
initial LBO + GDP benchmarks at the time of exit between + Developing * GDP 
benchmarks at the time of initial LBO + Developing * GDP benchmarks at the time of 
exit  + Govt. effectiveness + Rule Law + # of procedures + Target Debt/Capital Ratio 
List of Variables and Definitions 
Variables Definition of Variables 
Return Percentage annualized return of the LBO from the 
initial LBO to the exit. This is calculated by taking the 
difference between LBO exit value and LBO initial 
transaction value. This difference is then divided by 
the number of days to exit and multiplied by 365 to get 
annualized return. 
Days to exit Time period from initial LBO to the time of exit 
through any of the exit methods mentioned. 
Quick flips Dummy variable to show if the exit transaction is a 
quick flip. In other words, quick flips take less than 2 
years to exit 
Developing Dummy variable of target belongs to developing 
country or developed country (a value of 1 is assigned 
to developing economies and 0 is assigned to 
developed economies). 
Reputed Dummy variable to indicate good reputation of the 
buyer firms. 
Same country Dummy variable to indicate if the buyer and target 
firm belong to the same country. 
Target Industry Dummy variables for various industries of the target 
firms 
Same Industry Dummy variable to indicate if the target and the buyer 
belong to the same industry 
Number of PE Firms  Total number of buyers (PE firms) involved in the 
LBO transactions (Club deals). 
Small Dummy variable to indicate if the firm is a small firm 
with a value of less than 10 Million USD. 
GDP GDP growth rate at the time of initial LBO transaction 
GDP at exit GDP growth rate at the time of exit of the LBO. 
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GDP at the time of initial 
LBO below 0 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate is 
below 0 when the initial LBO transaction occurred. 
GDP at the time of initial 
LBO between 0-2% 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate is 
above 0 when the initial LBO transaction occurred. 
GDP at the time of initial 
LBO between 2-5% 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate is 
above 2% but below 5% when the initial LBO 
transaction occurred. 
GDP at the time of initial 
LBO above 5% 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate is 
above 5% when the initial LBO transaction occurred. 
GDP at the time of exit 
below 0 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate at the 
time of exit of the LBO was below 0. 
GDP at the time of exit 
between 0 and 2% 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate at the 
time of exit of the LBO was between 0 and 2%. 
GDP at the time of exit 
between 2% and 5% 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate at the 
time of exit of the LBO was between 2% and 5%. 
GDP at the time of exit 
above 5% 
Dummy variable to indicate if GDP growth rate at the 
time of exit of the LBO was above 5% 
Developing * GDP 
below 0% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP Growth rate during initial 
LBO is below 0%. 
Developing * GDP 
between 0 and 2% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP Growth rate during initial 
LBO is between 0 and 2%. 
Developing * GDP 
between 2 and 5% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP Growth rate during initial 
LBO is between 2 and 5%. 
Developing * GDP 
above 5% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP Growth rate during initial 
LBO is above 5%. 
Developing * GDP at 
exit below 0% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP at exit is below 0% 
Developing * GDP 
between 0 and 2% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP at exit is between 0 and 2% 
Developing * GDP at 
exit between 2 and 5% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP at exit is between 2 and 5% 
Developing * GDP at 
exit above 5% 
Interaction variable between the dummy variable 
Developing and if GDP at exit is above 5% 
Debt/Capital ratio Debt/Capital ratio of the target firm 
Type of exit Dummy variable to indicate each individual type of 
exit. Public offering, Secondary LBO, MBO, Strategic 
sale or Bankruptcy 
Govt Government effectiveness. 
Law Rule of law 
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Numb of proced Number of procedures required to set up a new 
business in the country 
Club deals * developing  Club deal in developing economies 
Club deals * developing 
* reputed  
Club deals in developing economies which involves 
reputed PE firms 
Club deals * Small Club deals of small firms 
Club deals * Large Club deals of large firms 
Club deals * Small * Dev Club deals of small firms in developing economies 
Club deals * Large * Dev club deals of large firms in developing economies, 
Club deals * time 
period 
Club deals in different decades (1980 to 2012). 
 
I divide the LBO activity into two categories based on the country of origin of 
the target. I classify and compare leveraged buyout activity as LBOs in developed 
countries and LBOs in developing countries. The classification of whether the country 
belonged to a developed country or a developing country (Variable: Developing) was 
done based on International Monetary Fund’s World economic outlook report, April 
2012. There were 1900 transactions were from developing countries. The remaining 
15,000 transactions were from developed countries. This clearly shows that the LBO’s 
are mainly in developed economies. Variable “Developing” is a dummy variable which 
takes a value one if the target firm is from a developing country and takes a value zero 
if the target firm is from a developed economy. 
To measure reputation, I use top 50 PE firms from “Private Equity International 
300 (PEI 300, May 2012)”. The PE firms are ranked based on their past 5 year (2006 – 
2011) fund raising in Million USD. They also provide the PE firms ranking change 
from previous year. Among the top 50 PE rankings, only one PE firm was a new entry 
in the top 50 ranking spot. All the other PE firms have moved just one or two spots 
(either up or down) from the previous ranking. Even though, some of the transactions 
took place long before 2011, I consider this report to be close enough since most of the 
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transactions that were collected from CapitalIQ were after the year 2000 and exited in 
the recent years. Hence the firms in this report will give a close measure of the 
reputation of the Private Equity (PE) firms in the sample. To measure reputation, a 
dummy variable called “Reputed” is created that takes a value “one” if one or more of 
the PE firm/s involved in the LBO transaction belongs to the top 50 PE firms and is 
given a value “zero” otherwise. (Hypothesis 3: Reputed PE firms result in higher 
returns of the target firm and takes fewer days to exit). 
I look at the effect of number of days to exit on the returns of the LBO (equation 
2). The dummy variable “Quick flips” refers to investments held for less than 2 years. It 
is a Dummy variable which takes a value “one” if the firm exits within 2 years (730 
days) of initial LBO and takes a value “zero” if the LBO takes longer than 2 years to 
exit. I also look at the effect of returns on the “Number of days to exit” (regression 
equation 3).  
I test the returns of the LBOs when the country of the PE firm and the target 
firm are same. Since returns of reputed firms are expected to be higher, the returns of 
LBOs transactions that have both target and buyer from the same country will have 
lower returns. This is because the target firm and reputed PE firm are not necessarily 
from the same country. (Hypothesis 3: Reputed PE firms result in higher returns of the 
target firm and take fewer days to exit). 
The variable Target industry is the “Industry classification benchmark” 
launched by DOW Jones and FTSE in 2005. It is used to segregate markets into sectors 
within the macro-economy. Dummy variable is created if the target firm and the PE 
firm are from the same industry. A value of “one” is assigned if the target firm and the 
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PE firm are from the same industry. This is to determine if there is any 
increase/decrease in returns when the target and the buyer firms operate in the same 
industry. For this dummy variable even if one of the multiple buyers (PE firms) are in 
the same industry as the target firm, then a value of “one” is assigned to the variable; 
and if none of the buyers belong to the industry as that of the target firm, then a value 
“zero” is assigned to the variable.  
Next, as in the paper, Officer, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010), I include a variable to 
indicate if the buyer is a syndicate of PE firms (club deals). This is to test if higher 
number of PE firms, have an influence in increasing the returns. I even test the 
influence of number of PE firms on the number of days to exit for the LBO. The 
variable “# of PE firms” shows how many PE firms are involved in the LBO 
transaction. Club deals generally depress the initial LBO prices and hence result in 
higher returns. They also tend to exit sooner due to the experience of all the buyers 
involved. (Hypothesis 5: Club deals (LBO transactions that have more than one PE 
firm) result in higher returns and exit sooner). 
I also include variables to test if the size of the target firm influences the return 
of the leveraged buyout transaction or the amount of time taken by the firm to exit.  I 
create three dummy variables “small”, “medium” and “large”. The firms are divided 
based on the value of the LBO. Small: < $10 Million, medium: $10 – $100 million, 
large: > $100 million. (Hypothesis 4: Smaller firms have higher returns when compared 
to large firms Small firms also take shorter time periods to exit when compared with 
larger firms). 
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To test other effects related to club deals, I use- various interaction variables 
with club deals variable. To test of club deals involving at-least one reputed PE firm 
has a positive effect on the returns or how long it takes to exit, I use the interaction 
variable club deals with reputation. Effect of club deals on size of the target firm is 
tested by using the interaction variables club deals * size, where size is small or large 
target firm. Also club deals in various time periods are tested using club deals * time 
period. Here each time period is 1980 – 1989, 1990 – 1999, 2000 – 2009 or 2010 – 
2012. Results of club deals in developing economies can be tested by using the 
interaction variable club deals * developing.  
The variables GDP and GDP at exit can help us test if GDP growth rate at the 
time of initial LBO and GDP growth rate at the time of exit has an influence on the 
returns or the days taken to exit the LBO. I choose different levels of GDP as 
benchmarks of economic growth and look at how returns vary in the different 
benchmark levels chosen. I sort transactions (both initial LBO transaction and exit of 
the LBO) that took place during a period when the GDP was lesser than 0%; when 
GDP was between 0 and 2%; when the GDP is between 2 and 5%; and when the GDP 
is greater than 5%.  
I compare how the dependent variables “returns” and also “days to exit” depend 
on these three categories and analyze how these two dependent variables vary for 
developed and developing countries. This benchmark permits us to compare the 
transactions that took place in times when the market was performing badly (GDP 
lesser than 0). I can also examine slow/moderate growth periods (GDP between 0 and 
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2) and also when the economy is growing fast (GDP greater than 2% and GDP greater 
than 5%).  
Since the benchmark is different for different countries, for example, a 
developing country may have much higher GDP growth rates than the 6 percent level 
that I have chosen for high growth phase, and a developed economy may have an 
average GDP rate of 2% (most of the transactions are in the US and UK and 2% level, 
however some of the developing countries have an average GDP rate of 5-9%). Assaad, 
Celaya, Cruikshank, and Foran (2011) show that investing in emerging markets yield 
high growth since the GDP growth rate in emerging markets is greater than the world 
average. Jain and Manna (2009) look at venture capital and private equity investments 
in India. They look at the merits and demerits of investing in India which is expecting a 
growth rate of 9%.  
Hence the four GDP benchmark classifications are more appropriate and lets me 
compare the effects of all the different levels of GDP rates of a country.  
Also, since one of my hypotheses is mainly based on if the returns in developing 
markets are higher or lower compared the returns in developed markets, I include 
interaction variables between the variable “Developing” with each of the four variables 
“GDP below 0%”, “GDP at exit below 0%”, “GDP between 2% and 5%” and “GDP at 
exit between 2% and 5%”. This creates four different variables that permits us to  test if 
returns are lower or higher for developing markets during periods of economic boom 
(GDP growth rate between 2-5% and GDP growth rate above 5%) or recession (GDP 
growth rate below 0%). I can also test if time period to exit is higher or lower in the 
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different benchmark levels of economic growth in developing markets. These variables 
help us to verify Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
I also include interaction variables of “Developing” with each of the variables 
“GDP <0%”, “GDP 0-2%”, “GDP 2-5%” and GDP >5%”. This permits us to test how 
LBOs in developing countries in different levels of GDP growth rate that was prevalent 
at the time of initial LBO. The variable Type of exit includes the different types of exit 
routes of the LBO transaction. I use as the exit routes, Secondary LBO, strategic sale, 
public offering and bankruptcy. I exclude the observations that had “terms not 
disclosed” for the exit method from the regression since these observations do not have 
transaction value for the interpretation of results.  
When I compare the Target debt/capital ratio in developed and developing 
economies, I find that: average Debt/Capital ratio in developed economies is 69.21%. 
In developing economies, the average Debt/Capital ratio is 37.88%. The reason for a 
higher Debt/Capital ratio in case of developed economies is that the interest rates in 
developed economies are low as compared to that of the developing economies; hence 
they have a higher ability to pay off high debt. Also the credit rating is high hence 
developed economies can obtain higher debt easily. Debt/Capital ratio results in lower 
returns and takes longer periods to exit due to the high risk involved in such 
transactions.  
Finally I include three variables to test the effect of regulation, law enforcement 
and ease of setting up a business on the returns on days to exit the LBO. Better law 
enforcement and corporate governance in target country results in higher returns. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (2002) and Leeds and Sunderland (2003) find  
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developing countries do not have very effective corporate governance, legal systems to 
enforce legal contracts or government effectiveness and hence result in low returns on 
the transactions.   
Government effectiveness, range from -2.5 to 2.5. (Source: Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003)). They combine into a single grouping responses on the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is 
on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good 
policies and deliver public goods.  
 Law = rule of law, range from -2.5 to 2.5. (Source: Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003)). They include several indicators which measure the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions 
of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society 
in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for 
economic and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights 
are protected. 
Numb of procedures is defined as the number of procedures required to start up 
a firm. Range from 2 – 21. Where 2 means, it is easiest to start a firm and 21 is where it 
requires 21 procedures to start a business and hence it is most difficult to start a 
business in these target firms. This helps us test if it is easy to exit the LBO and start 
over as a new firm. (Source: Djankov, La Portla, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer (2002)).  
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La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that Good law 
enforcement has an effect on valuation and breadth of debt and equity markets. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) show that poor shareholder 
protection is penalized with lower valuations, and that higher cash-flow ownership by 
the controlling shareholder improves valuation, especially in countries with poor 
investor protection. Djankov, La Portla, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer (2003) show that in 
civil law countries, procedure by litigants and courts is systematically greater than in 
common law countries.  
Leeds and Sunderland (2003) find that the returns in developed markets do not 
compensate for the high risk involved in the transactions. This is mainly due to low 
standards of corporate governance in terms of quality of information required for 
investment decisions, weakness in legal systems to enforce legal contracts and 
protecting all classes of investors; and the inability of domestic equity markets to offer 
reasonable exit prospects through public offering. They also mention that private equity 
investors differentiate investments between countries based on protection to 
shareholder rights, tax treatment of capital gains, and securities market development.  
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RESULTS 
 
 
The initial regression results (regression of equation 1) shows how the value of the firm 
depends on various other variables are provided in the Table 18 below. For this 
regression I use all the observations that have initial LBO transaction value.  
 
Table 18: Initial regression: Dependent Variable: Value of the LBO (in USD Million) 
  (a)   (b)   c)   
Variables Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
constant -1720.77 0.0000 -1327.135 0.0000   
Reputed 445.35 0.0000 445.35 0.0000 400.86 0.0000 
Developing -204.06 0.0749 -204.06 0.0749 -246.39 0.0328 
Same 
Country 
-14.32 0.7941 -14.32 0.7941 -263.96 0.0000 
Same 
Industry 
72.66 0.3171 72.66 0.3171 -31.06 0.6694 
# of PE firms 397.52 0.0000 397.52 0.0000 305.12 0.0000 
GDP 78.8 0.0001 78.8 0.0001 143.45 0.0000 
GDP less 0    -393.63 0.0006 -913.65 0.0000 
GDP 0 to 2% 393.64 0.0006     
GDP 2 – 5% 601.52 0.0000 601.52 0.0000 102.19 0.1266 
GDP above 
5% 
898.36 0.0001 898.36 0.0001 567.68 0.0003 
Target Debt/ 
Capital Ratio 
17.12 0.0000 17.12 0.0000 7.86 0.0000 
R-squared 0.07088   0.07088   0.05602   
Regression (a) includes the variable GDP 0 – 2% but excludes the variable GDP less 
than 0%. Regressions (b) and (c) include the variable GDP less than 0%. Regression (c) 
is different from (b) in that (c) does not use the constant term for regression.  
 
Table 18 shows regression results of dependency of Value of LBO (in Million USD) on 
various other factors. There are three parts of the table, regression a), b) and c). 
Regressions (a) and (b) include a constant to regression. In Regression c), I exclude the 
constant of regression. In Regression (a), I exclude the dummy variable when GDP is 
less than 0% and in regression (b), I exclude the dummy variable when GDP is between 
0 and 2%.  
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The regression results above show that the variable reputed has a positive 
coefficient, which means that if the PE firm is reputed, then the value of the deal is 
higher by 400 - 445 million USD in all the three regression results in table 18. This 
shows that reputed PE firms take up larger LBOs. From the coefficient of variable 
“developing”, I observe that if the target firm is from a developing country, then the 
value of the LBO is smaller by 204 million USD in regressions a) and b) and is smaller 
by 246 million USD in regression c). This means developing firms LBO value is 
smaller in general. If the target firm and the PE firm are from the same country, I find 
that the value of the deal is lower. This could be due to the fact that reputed PE firms 
are generally from different country as compared to the target firm country and hence 
the lower value of deals.  
If the PE firm and the target firm are from the same industry, then the value of 
the LBO deals are higher. This because, the LBOs between firms in the same industry 
tend to perform better due to more knowledge in the field and economies of scale in the 
combined business. If the number of PE firms is higher, then the value of the deal is 
higher by 398 million USD as shown by coefficient “# of PE firms” in regressions a) 
and b). In regression c), the coefficient “# of PE firms” is higher by 305 million USD. 
This is in line with the finding that club deals (syndicate of PE firms) are involved in 
larger LBOs’ since they can get better terms on the loan due to reputation and capacity 
to borrow more funds due to their sheer size and number.  
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Table 19: Dependent variable: Annual Return of the LBO 
Annual return is calculated by dividing the total return of the LBO/MBO by the number 
of days to exit, times 365days [Annual return = (Return of LBO / # of days to exit) * 
365] 
            
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Variables                           Coefficients 
Constant 27.38*** 34.74*** 22.3 22.246 15.818 
Days to exit  -0.0036* -0.0036* -0.0035* -0.004* -0.004* 
Quick flips 7.181*** 7.269*** 7.26*** 5.735 5.666 
Reputed 5.432*** 5.459*** 5.45*** 5.44*** 5.42*** 
Developing -3.431 -8.453 -8.45 -10.127 -5.708 
Same Country -4.656 -4.794 -4.79 -5.446 -5.326 
Same Industry 0.59 0.552 0.55 -0.364 -0.323 
# of PE firms 4.099* 4.093* 4.09* 3.976* 3.98* 
Small 5.409*** 5.327*** 5.32*** 8.716* 8.788* 
GDP   -1.212 -1.212 -1.21 -1.422 -1.421 
GDP at exit 2.244 2.235 2.23 1.614 1.623 
GDP less 0  -10.741 -11.034 -11.03 -12.575 -12.308 
GDP 2 – 5% -1.573 -1.723 -1.72 -0.852 -0.717 
GDP above 5% 1.797 1.17 1.17 4.892 5.443 
Exit GDP less 0  3.336 5.381 5.38 2.662 0.884 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% 8.464*** 8.992*** 8.99*** 8.344*** 7.90*** 
Exit GDP > 5% 7.818 6.195 6.19 3.866*** 5.342 
Dev * GDP less 0 12.078 12.883 12.88 19.662 18.931 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -13.172 -13.902 -13.9 -10.152 -9.518 
Dev * GDP > 5% -12.797 -13.343 -13.34 -9.456 -8.991 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -12.1*** -12.4***  -13.05** -12.8** 
Dev *Exit GDP 0 - 2%   12.43***   
Dev *Exit GDP 2– 5% 7.028*** 6.970*** 19.40** 6.986*** 7.04*** 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  20.33*** 19.52*** 31.95** 21.13*** 21.8*** 
Public offering -9.201** -9.185** -9.18**   
SLBO 3.01 3.091 3.09   
Strategic Sale -7.616 -7.599 -7.59   
Exits not Bankrupt    4.928 4.855 
Bankruptcy -8.423 -8.475 -8.47   
Govt effective 3.966 8.967 8.96 9.918 5.486 
Rule Law  -8.097 -8.09 -7.156  
# of procedures 0.169 -0.033 -0.033 0.234 0.411 
Debt/Cap Ratio -0.0269 -0.027 -0.027 -0.011 -0.011 
R-squared 0.040924 0.041105 0.041105 0.035725 0.03558 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. ***significant at 
10% confidence level.  
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From the coefficients GDP, GDP between 0 and 2%, GDP between 2 and 5% 
and GDP above 5%, I observe that if the target GDP growth rate is less than 0%, then 
the value of the LBO is lower and as the GDP growth rate increases, the value of the 
LBO is higher. This shows that in periods when the economy is not doing well, the 
large firms do not tend to involve in a LBO activity; and during periods of recession, 
the LBOs that take place are from smaller target firms. From the coefficient target 
debt/capital ratio, I find that if the debt/capital ratio of the target firm is high, then the 
value of the LBO is higher. This shows that high debt levels are used to finance the 
larger LBO deals.  
Tables 19 and 20 include only those transactions that have exit transaction value 
information. Table 19 shows results of OLS regression where “Annualized return” of 
the LBO is the dependent variable. Annualized return is calculated as the total return on 
the LBO averaged per year. This provides a leveled field for comparison of various 
transactions that took different time periods to exit the LBO transactions.  
Table 19 has five different OLS regression results. In table 19 regression (b), I 
include the variable “Rule Law”. In Regression (c), I use the variable “dev * exit GDP 
0-2%”. This variable is to test if the firms in developing markets during the time of 
moderate economic growth have higher or lower returns. In Regressions (d) and (e), I 
use a general variable for type of exit. I use the variable “Exits not bankrupt” to test the 
returns of firms that exit successfully either through either, public offering, strategic 
sale or secondary LBO. 
From table 19, the interpretation of the dependency of various coefficients on 
the annual return of the LBO is as follows: Variable “Days to exit” has a negative 
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coefficient, which implies that if the firm takes longer time to exit, then the Annualized 
returns are lower. This is in line with the previous finding that quick flips (LBOs that 
exit within 2 years) have higher returns. This is also evident from the variable “quick 
flips”, which has a positive coefficient; and hence I can interpret that on average quick 
flips result in about 7% higher returns.  
Coefficient of variable reputed has a positive coefficient implying that reputed 
firms have higher returns of about 2.6 – 4.6% the same as results found in other 
previous studies such as: Stromberg (2008) found that LBO transactions that are 
sponsored by more experienced PE partnerships tend to stay in LBO ownership for a 
shorter period of time, are more likely to go public, and are less likely to end in 
bankruptcy or financial restructuring. Demiroglu and James (2010) found that 
reputation is positively related to buyout leverage. My results on variable reputed 
proves a part of Hypothesis 3: Reputed PE firms result in higher returns of the target 
firm and takes fewer days to exit. 
Variable “developing” has negative coefficient, showing that target firms from 
developing economy have a negative coefficient, implying that if a LBO is from 
developing country, then the returns are lower in general (in all the regressions in table 
19).  
The variable “same country” has a negative coefficient, which means that if the 
target firm and the PE firm are from the same country, then the returns are lower. This 
is because reputed PE firms result in higher returns. Reputed PE firms are generally not 
from the same country hence if the target firm and the PE firm are from the same 
country, the returns tend to be lower.  
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The variable, same industry is positive, implying that if the target firm and the 
PE firm are from the same industry, then the returns are positive. If the target firm and 
the buyer firm are from the same industry, they will have more knowledge about 
operating procedures. This might also be due to economies of scale from operating in 
the combined firm.   
“# of PE firms” shows that if the number of PE firms is higher, then the returns 
are higher. This proves a part of my hypothesis 5: Club deals (LBO transactions that 
have more than one PE firm) result in higher returns and exit sooner. This is because; in 
a club deal the initial price of the LBO is depressed and hence PE firms can make a 
higher profit upon exit. This is because club deal buyers have better negotiating power 
with the target firm; they can also get better loan terms due to their higher reputation. 
Since the PE firms have the advantage of buying the LBO initially at a lower price, this 
results in higher returns at the time of the exit. Also since more number of buyers are 
involved in the club deal, reputation of this consortium of the buyers is higher and they 
can invest huge amount which a single PE firm may not be able to invest. Officer, 
Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) find that club deals reduce the returns of the leveraged 
buyout since they reduce the competitiveness during the initial process of the leveraged 
buyout deals.  
The variable, “small” has a positive coefficient, which shows that smaller firms 
have higher returns. This result confirms the results found by Demiroglu and James 
(2010) and Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2010), who found that small 
investments outperform large ones. This proves a part of my hypothesis 4. 
 
 
76 
GDP at the time of initial LBO has a negative coefficient; however, GDP at the 
time of initial LBO should not have an influence on the returns. From the regression 
results, I also see that if GDP at exit is high, then the returns are higher. If GDP is less 
than 0%, then the returns of the LBO are negative. If the GDP is between 2% and 5%, 
then the returns of the LBO are less in absolute terms; however it is still negative. If the 
GDP is greater than 5%, it results in higher returns.  
If Exit GDP is lower than 0%, then the returns are positive but lesser in 
magnitude.  Also the variables “Exit GDP is higher than 2%” and “exit GDP >5%” are 
positive and higher in magnitude, implying that if the GDP at the time of exit is higher, 
then the returns are higher for the LBO.   
As a unique contribution to literature, I look at the interaction between the 
variable Developing and Various benchmark levels of Exit GDP. The interaction of 
variables “Developing” and “Exit GDP below 0%” is negative and high in magnitude. 
This shows that if the firm is from a developing country and if the economy is bad, then 
the LBOs perform very badly. However, as the GDP increases, the returns in 
developing countries increase. This is evident from interaction of variable “developing” 
with “Exit GDP between 0-2%”, “Exit GDP 2-5%” or “Exit GDP above 5%”. If the 
exit GDP is between 2% and 5%, and the target firm is from a developing country, then 
the returns are higher by about 7% in regressions (a), (b), (d) and (e) of table 19. If the 
exit GDP is above 5%, and the target is from a developing country, the results are much 
higher in magnitude. The returns are higher by 20% - 21% as shown in regressions (a), 
(b), (d) and (e). These results prove my hypothesis 1: that if the economy is booming 
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then returns in developing countries are higher and in periods of low economic growth, 
returns in developed nations are higher.  
When I look at how the different exit routes influence the returns of the LBO, I 
find that secondary LBOs result in highest returns and public offering and bankruptcy 
result in negative returns. Public offering data entered in CapitalIQ is probably entered 
in different phases that the firm went public. I also run regressions using only 
successful exits (i.e., public offering, strategic sale and secondary LBO), the results are 
shown in regressions (d) and (e) of table 19. This variable shows that returns for 
successful exits which exclude bankruptcy are positive. This shows that on average 
LBOs have positive returns when we do not take bankruptcies into account.  
The variable “Government effectiveness” is positive; hence I interpret that if 
government effectiveness is higher in a country, then the returns will be higher. Also if 
the Target firm’s Debt/capital ratio is high, then returns are lower since higher debt 
levels are perceived to be more risky for the PE firm.  
Table 20 and 21 show OLS regression results where “days to exit” is the 
dependent variable. “days to exit” is defined as the number of days from the initial 
LBO to the date when the LBO exits through either Secondary LBO, strategic sale, 
bankruptcy or public offering.  
Table 20 shows results of five OLS regressions. All the regressions have the same 
dependent variable “days to exit”. Here I am comparing how various factors affect the 
time taken to exit the LBO. The regressions a-e in table 20 eliminate the variable 
“quick flips” as an explanatory variable.  
 
 
 
78 
Table 20: Dependent variable: Number of days to exit the LBO.  
Number of days to exit is the total number of days from the initial LBO/MBO to the 
date that the LBO/MBO exited through one of the exit routes. 
            
  (a)       (b)      ( c)     ( d)     ( e) 
           Variables               Coefficients 
Constant 976.51* 746.8*** 746.8*** 778.0*** 1003*** 
Returns -2.35* -2.34* -2.34* -2.56* -2.57* 
Reputed -178.16** -179.1** -179.1** -163.2** -162.2** 
Developing 2696.41* 2851.22* 2851.22* 3065.54* 2913.87* 
Same Country 264.65* 268.67* 268.67* 312.70* 308.82* 
Same Industry 230.63 232.06 232.06 252.8*** 251.2*** 
# of PE firms 4.63 4.87 4.87 11.55 11.32 
Small -89.57 -86.96 -86.96 -248.66* -251.29* 
GDP 106.39* 106.64* 106.64* 135.30* 135.04* 
GDP at exit  -66.81* -66.81* -66.81* -59.49** -59.50** 
GDP less 0  683.02* 691.66* 691.66* 754.03* 745.33* 
GDP 2 – 5% 174.13 178.77 178.77 139.03 134.41 
GDP above 5% -102.16 -82.91 -82.91 -257.33 -276.23 
Exit GDP less 0  31.76 41.51 41.51 69.57 59.91 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -324.07* -322.06* -322.06* -328.89* -330.88* 
Exit GDP > 5% -337.07 -311.92 -311.92 -384.53 -409.23 
Dev * GDP less 0 -758.94 -783.93 -783.93 -1020.6 -995.57 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -699.94 -677.02 -677.02 -801.77 -823.95 
Dev * GDP > 5% -773.04 -756.34 -756.34 -863.3 -879.34 
Dev *ExitGDP < 0  -2974.10* -2923.0*  -3038.9* -3090.4* 
Dev*ExitGDP 0-2%   2923.02*   
Dev*ExitGDP 2-5% -831.82 -847.72 2075.30* -956.15 -941.3 
Dev*ExitGDP > 5% -1457*** -1520*** 1402.7** -1554*** -1493** 
Public offering   518.01* 517.36* 517.36*   
SLBO 157.4*** 155.3*** 155.3***   
Strategic Sale 365.27* 364.79* 364.79*   
Exits not bankrupt    352.99* 353.92** 
Bankruptcy -53.59 -53.53 -53.53   
Govt effective 358.24* 203.76 203.76 181.21 333.48** 
Rule Law  250.4 250.4 246.29  
# of procedures -4.82 1.46 1.46 -7.12 -13.27 
Debt/Cap Ratio 1.44 1.44 1.44 0.86 0.859 
R-squared 0.105429 0.10572 0.10572 0.09219 0.09191 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
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Table 21: Regression using “Days to Exit” as the dependent variable. 
Table 21 includes the explanatory variable quick flips as an explanatory variable; the 
results are similar to regressions a-f. Hence regressions f-j serve as robustness tests 
            
  (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Variables 
Constant 1456.47* 1134.92* 1134.92* 1493.6* 1792.4* 
Returns -1.55* -1.54* -1.54* -1.81* -1.81* 
Quick flips -1976.6* -1978.9* -1978.8* -1950.2* -1948* 
Reputed -79.93 -81.06 -81.06 -51.96 -50.85 
Developing 2121.18* 2338.09* 2338.09* 2479.34* 2276.5* 
Same Country 255.21* 261.02* 261.02* 308.80* 303.43* 
Same Industry 231.5*** 232.9*** 232.9*** 277.57** 275.9** 
# of PE firms -45.67 -45.41 -45.41 -38.61 -38.84 
Small -104*** -100.3 -100.3 -261.94* -265.4* 
GDP 60.61** 60.92** 60.92** 94.55* 94.23* 
GDP at exit  -42.9*** -42.85*** -42.9*** -34.27 -34.34 
GDP less 0  679.14* 691.41* 691.41* 787.38* 775.51* 
GDP 2 – 5% 274.31* 280.66* 280.66* 244.66** 238.6** 
GDP above 5% 130.83 158.03 158.03 -23.48 -49.01 
Exit GDP less 0  151.83 165.56 165.56 192.4 179.43 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -271.52* -268.86* -268.86* -274.49* -277.0* 
Exit GDP > 5% -378.99 -343.91 -343.91 -430.6** -463** 
Dev * GDP less 0 -469.37 -504.13 -504.13 -731.47 -698.03 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -794.24 -761.67 -761.67 -872.35 -902.35 
Dev * GDP > 5% -416.80* -392.6** -392.59 -532.23 -554.21 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -2234.16 -2161.73  -2229.6* -2299* 
Dev * Exit GDP 0- 2%   2161.7**   
Dev * Exit GDP 2– 5% -655.45 -677.96 1483.7** -772.83 -752.89 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5% -1090.84 -1179*** 982.74 -1178.64 -1097.1 
Public offering  494.46* 493.45* 493.45*   
SLBO -6.05 -9.63 -9.63   
Strategic Sale 187.74** 186.9*** 186.9***   
Exits not Bankrupt    52.61 56.04 
Bankruptcy 152.08 154.32 154.32   
Govt. effective 271.88** 53.89 53.89 0.68 206*** 
Rule Law  352.49 352.49 331.04  
# of procedures 1.3 10.1 10.1 -3.69 -11.91 
Debt/Cap Ratio 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.189 0.18 
R-squared 0.29080 0.29138 0.29138 0.27456 0.27405 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
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Regressions f-j in table 21 include the explanatory variable “quick flips” in the 
regressions. The results in the regressions a-e and f-j are similar in terms of sign of the 
coefficients. Only the magnitude of the coefficients varies slightly. Hence regressions f-
j serve as robustness tests. I now analyze regressions a-e in table 20. 
From the results of regressions a-e of table 20, the coefficient of the variable 
“returns” is negative; this means that if the returns of the LBO are high, then the LBO 
exits sooner. From the variable “Reputed” I see that if the PE firm is a reputed firm, 
then the LBO exits sooner by 180 days on average. From the coefficient of variable 
“Developing” I interpret this to mean that if the target firm is from a developing 
country, then the LBO takes longer time to exit. Co-efficient of variable “developing” 
positive, but from the data, it was evident that LBOs in developing economies exit 
sooner. However when separate regression was performed, variable “developing” had a 
negative co-efficient implying that LBOs in developing economies exit sooner.  
If the “# of PE firms” is higher, then it takes more number of days to exit the LBO 
in all the regressions a – e, but however in regressions f through j, the value is negative 
and higher in absolute magnitude. This shows that on average Club deals take shorter 
time periods to exit mainly due to the reputation of the syndicate of buyer firms. This 
proves the remaining part of my Hypothesis 5.  
The results in tables 20 and 21 also show that small firms exit sooner when 
compared with larger firms. This could be because of the ease if finding buyers for a 
firm that is smaller in market capitalization. This proves the remaining part of 
Hypothesis 4.  
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Higher the GDP at the time of initial LBO, longer it takes to exit (variable 
GDP). Higher GDP at the time of exit of the LBO results in sooner exits (Variable 
“GDP at exit”). If the GDP at the time of initial LBO was lesser than 0%, then the LBO 
takes 680 – 750 days more to exit (variable “GDP less 0”). If GDP at the time of initial 
LBO is higher than 2% but lesser than 5%, then the LBO takes about 175 days more to 
exit (Variable “GDP 2-5%”). If exit GDP is above 5%, then the LBOs exit sooner by 83 
- 276 days (variable “GDP > 5 %”).  
For proving my main Hypothesis 2, I use interaction variables between 
“Developing” and the different exit GDP benchmarks. The interaction variable between 
Developing and Exit GDP below 0% shows that if the exit GDP is below 0% and if the 
target firm is from a developing country, then the exit takes shorter time to exit when 
compared with developed markets (Variable “Dev * Exit GDP < 0”).  This is because if 
the PE firm invests in a target firm in the developing market and the GDP growth rate 
declines to less than 0%, then the PE firm would like to exit sooner in order to avoid 
greater losses. In periods of moderate economic growth rate (Exit GDP between 0 – 
2%) the LBOs in developing economies take longer periods to exit.  
If the target firm is from a developing country, and if the GDP is between 2-5%, 
then the LBO takes about 832 – 956 days lesser to exit (variable “Dev * Exit GDP 2 - 
5%”). If the GDP is above 5% and the target firm is from a developing country, then 
the LBO takes about 1400 days lesser to exit (variable “Dev * Exit GDP >5%”). This 
proves my Hypothesis 2. 
When I look at the effect of different methods to exit on the time period taken to 
exit the LBO, I find that public offering method of exit takes the longest time to exit 
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mainly due to higher complexity and regulations required for this type of exit. Strategic 
sale and bankruptcy methods also takes long time periods to exit. LBOs that exit 
through Secondary LBO method take the shortest time periods to exit.  
From table 20 I also find that if government effectiveness or rule law in a target 
country is high, then it takes longer time to exit. If the number of procedures required to 
start a business are high, then it takes longer time to exit due to the difficulty of starting 
as a new entity after exit. And finally, if the Debt/Capital ratio of the target firm is high, 
it takes longer time to exit the LBO. The high amounts of debt in the firm may take 
longer time to be paid off.  
 For the results in table 21, I also performed negative binomial regression and 
found results similar to that in table 21. The results are in Appendix D at the end of the 
paper.  The results are similar to the OLS regression in table 21. The results show that if 
the PE firm is reputed then it takes fewer days to exit the LBO. If the target firm is from 
a developing economy, it takes longer time to exit. Small firms exit sooner when 
compared to larger firms. If the GDP at the time of exit is high, then it leads to fewer 
days of exit. public offering takes longest time to exit and strategic sale method takes 
the shortest time to exit when compared with other methods of exit.  
Table 22 shows regression results of dependent variable annualized returns with 
the dependent variables used in table 19. Also in table 22, an additional variable club 
deals in developing economies (variable: club deal * developing) is added to test if club 
deals in developing economies have higher or lower returns as compared to club deals 
in developed economies.  
 
 
83 
Table 22: Regression using Annualized return as the dependent variable and new 
interaction variable club deals in developing economies is added.  
          
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variables                           Coefficients 
Constant 26.89*** 34.171*** 15.44318 21.82902 
Days to exit  -0.00355* -0.00354* -0.0041* -0.00406* 
Quick flips 7.1805*** 7.267*** 5.660496 5.729678 
Reputed 5.389*** 5.419*** 5.3824*** 5.4095*** 
Developing 0.1493 -5.0762 -3.119757 -7.741038 
Same Country -4.6286 -4.766 -5.306546 -5.42698 
Same Industry 0.5701 0.5346 -0.341088 -0.379135 
# of PE firms 4.1468* 4.137* 4.015530* 4.007219* 
Club deal * develping -8.111 -7.479 -5.83696 -5.258955 
Small 5.3792*** 5.3007*** 8.767344* 8.698445* 
GDP   2.229 2.2216 1.611658 1.60415 
GDP at exit -1.239 -1.2371 -1.440688 -1.439431 
GDP less 0  -10.768 -11.055 -12.33385 -12.59467 
GDP 2 – 5% -1.54 -1.6912 -0.694557 -0.82944 
GDP above 5% 1.897 1.2711 5.518317 4.965735 
Exit GDP less 0  4.0784 2.7707 2.638924 1.449081 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% 4.4127 5.2482 4.982463 5.707646 
Exit GDP > 5% 0.1121 2.3773 -1.444426 0.542712 
Dev * GDP less 0 13.703 14.369 20.10213 20.70789 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -10.068 -11.029 -7.285949 -8.132638 
Dev * GDP > 5% -12.451 -13.0157 -8.736699 -9.221353 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -12.24*** 12.546** -12.865** -13.133** 
Dev * Exit GDP 2– 5% 7.065** 7.057*** 7.0644*** 7.0110*** 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  20.492*** 19.688*** 21.955*** 21.245*** 
Public offering   -9.1999** -9.184**   
SLBO 3.051 3.1286   
Strategic Sale -7.58 -7.5657   
Exits not Bankrupt   4.873169 4.94317 
Bankruptcy -8.431 -8.4825   
Govt effective 4.204 9.112 5.664603 10.02508 
Rule Law  -7.976  -7.068135 
# of procedures 0.1733 -0.02617 0.414848 0.239128 
Debt/Cap Ratio -0.0267 0.026855 -0.01113 -0.01118 
R-squared 0.04096 0.041137 0.035603 0.035741 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
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From the above regression results in table 22, I see that the returns for club deals in 
developing markets are negative showing that club deals are profitable in developed 
nations alone.  
In table 23, I look at the number of days it takes for the LBO to exit. From the 
coefficient of interaction variable Club deals with developing markets, I see that club 
deals in developing markets in general take shorter time to exit. This may be a result of 
the negative returns of club deals in developing markets and also as a result of 
discrepancies between the consortium PE firms. Hence the PE firms would like to end 
the club deal sooner in developing markets as compared to club deals in developed 
markets.  
Table 24 shows regression results of dependent variable returns with most of the 
explanatory variables used in table 19. This table also includes additional variables, 
such as: Interaction of club deal with size of the target firm (“club deal * small” and 
“club deal* large”); and interaction of reputation with the size of the target firm (“club 
deal * small * reputed” and “club deal * large * reputed”). These interaction variables 
show if club deals of smaller firms perform better or if club deals in larger firms 
perform better. Table 24 shows that Variable “club deal* large” has a coefficient of 
8.36%. This means that returns of club deal transactions are high if the target firm is 
large. This is expected since club deals are in general meant to take advantage of the 
consortium of the partners in the deal, who depress initial LBO prices. Hence this 
results in higher returns. The returns of the club deals are lesser when the target firm is 
small (coefficient of Variable “club deal* small” = -6.796%).  
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Table 23: Regression using “# of days to exit” as the dependent variable and new 
interaction variable club deals in developing economies is added.  
          
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variables                           Coefficients 
Constant 1456.926* 1133.383* 1786.181* 1483.846* 
Return  -1.554886* -1.545503* -1.814695* -1.806645* 
Quick flips -1976.581* -1978.861* -1948.364* -1950.268* 
Reputed -79.88703 -81.16991 -51.39986 -52.68096 
Developing 2117.914** 2347.332* 2319.290* 2535.444* 
Same Country 255.1887* 261.0963* 303.7490* 309.2434* 
Same Industry 231.5447*** 232.9220*** 275.6022** 277.2005** 
# of PE firms -45.71471 -45.29104 -38.27603 -37.88409 
Club deal * develping 7.40596 -20.46555 -96.62375 -123.7555 
Small -103.889*** -100.3742 -265.7274* -262.3494* 
GDP   60.62993** 60.89136** 94.03529* 94.31098* 
GDP at exit -42.8806*** -42.9196*** -34.67139 -34.69611 
GDP less 0  679.1685* 691.3584* 775.0765* 786.8975* 
GDP 2 – 5% 274.2893* 280.7513* 238.9919** 245.1824** 
GDP above 5% 130.7411 158.3146 -47.77857 -21.73953 
Exit GDP less 0  151.9554 165.2519 177.879 190.4942 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -271.5631* -268.7655* -276.5744* -273.9069* 
Exit GDP > 5% -379.1403 -343.4605 -461.492*** -427.83** 
Dev * GDP less 0 -470.8624 -500.0659 -678.6343 -706.8331 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -797.0713 -753.8193 -865.3971 -824.826 
Dev * GDP > 5% -417.1217 -391.6951 -549.9978 -526.7046 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -2230.748** -2171.106** -2344.193* -2286.459* 
Dev * Exit GDP 2– 5% -651.7491 -688.2087 -801.2137 -834.8507 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  -1087.895 -1187.208 -1135.659 -1228.487 
Public offering  494.4644* 493.4596*   
SLBO -6.087216 -9.52811   
Strategic Sale 187.7082*** 186.9866***   
Bankruptcy 152.093 154.3037   
Govt effective 
     
271.668** 
54.29106 208.8852*** 3.196335 
Rule Law  352.8241  333.1079 
# of procedures 1.296821 10.1169 -11.85401 -3.566986 
Debt/Cap Ratio 0.935578 0.939973 0.190322 0.192729 
R-squared 0.290801 0.291383 0.274055 0.274575 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
 
 
86 
Table 24: Regression using “Return” as the dependent variable and new interaction 
variable club deals in developing economies is added. 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variables                                        Coefficients 
Constant 25.69819*** 28.31555*** 27.32028*** 27.21142*** 
Number Days to exit -0.003511* -0.003435* -0.003556* -0.003557* 
Quick flips 7.234639*** 7.521797*** 7.180534*** 7.175859*** 
Reputed 5.361620*** 4.384432 5.425396*** 5.443838*** 
Developing -4.079711 -3.041237 -3.027356 -3.296405 
Same Country -4.488594 -4.649945 -4.652967 -4.668235 
Same Industry 0.277483 -0.03238 0.588187 0.587269 
# of PE firms 4.913793* 2.867283*** 4.106715* 4.100281* 
Club deal * Small -6.795741    
Club deal * Large  8.363097***   
Club deal * Small * 
Dev 
  -2.626041  
Club deal * Large * 
Dev 
   -9.82705 
Small 7.414294* 6.217922** 5.419651*** 5.393185*** 
GDP   2.270975 2.267523 2.243868 2.247215 
GDP at exit -1.232551 -1.182451 -1.215851 -1.21362 
GDP less 0  -9.960664 -10.27027 -10.73757 -10.73843 
GDP 2 – 5% -1.176276 -1.657483 -1.571819 -1.580858 
GDP above 5% 2.044851 1.192655 1.801633 1.777545 
Exit GDP less 0  6.770282 -11.8478*** -12.1338*** -12.1285*** 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% 8.230821 7.078359** 7.033245*** 7.027727*** 
Exit GDP > 5% 3.891421 20.24896*** 20.34608*** 20.34765*** 
Dev * GDP less 0 11.65386 12.04263 12.18968 11.99591 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -13.07067 -12.58454 -12.74142 -12.82266 
Dev * GDP > 5% -13.04574 -12.37699 -12.82889 -12.89816 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -12.2013*** 6.128885 7.450114 7.960351 
Dev * Exit GDP  – 5% 7.052874** 7.221531 7.963018 8.431917 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  20.13349*** 2.297083 3.087187 3.539012 
Public offering  -9.165915** -9.648994** -9.194395** -9.227703** 
SLBO 3.256531 2.847386 3.014629 2.986385 
Strategic Sale -7.526824 -7.87490*** -7.595895 -7.643028 
Bankruptcy -8.865605 -8.690638 -8.419697 -8.449295 
Govt effective 3.807224 3.736734 3.989378 4.074409 
# of procedures 0.18205 0.204069 0.169411 0.172762 
Debt/Cap Ratio -0.027278 -0.025615 -0.026898 -0.027095 
R-squared 0.041522 0.042055 0.040926 0.040932 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
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Also I can test if the club deals in smaller firms or larger firms perform worse in 
developing markets as compared to club deals in developed markets. From the 
coefficients, “Club deals * Small * Developing” and “Club deals * Large * 
Developing”, I can test if small target firms or large target firms involved in club deals 
in developing markets perform better. From the regression results, I see that in 
developing markets, both small and large target firms involved in club deals result in 
negative returns. The negative returns may be due to discrepancies between the PE 
firms in the consortium of club deals. To sum up the results, I find that club deals are 
profitable only in developed markets and in larger target firms.  
In table 25, I look at the number of days it takes for the LBO to exit from the 
initial LBO transaction. The regression results show that club deals of smaller firms 
take longer time to exit (take 205 days more to exit in general) and club deals of large 
firms exit sooner by almost a year (360 days). Club deals in developing economies exit 
sooner irrespective of if the target firms are smaller or larger. Coefficient of variables 
“Club deal * small * developing” and “Club deal * large * developing” are -83 and -
563 respectively. It means that small club deals in developing economies exit about 83 
days sooner and larger club deals in developing economies exit 563 days sooner. This is 
again due to the same reason mentioned above: that club deals in developing economies 
might end up in discrepancies between the consortium of PE firms and hence may 
result in sooner exit or end of consortium of the deal. 
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Table 25: Regression using “# of days to exit” as the dependent variable and new 
interaction variable club deals in developing economies is added. 
          
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variables                           Coefficients 
Constant 1504.836* 1407.596* 1454.512* 1446.628* 
Return -1.534109* -1.496376* -1.554996* -1.555322* 
Quick flips -1975.779* -1981.716* -1976.574* -1976.724* 
Reputed -77.80257 -34.70938 -80.13501 -79.23989 
Developing 2138.052* 2093.939* 2134.003* 2128.758* 
Same Country 249.9180* 253.9021* 255.3138* 254.5037* 
Same Industry 240.6252*** 257.1080*** 231.4810*** 231.3791*** 
# of PE firms -70.25183** 7.370599 -45.42707 -45.59601 
Club deal * Small 204.8821***    
Club deal * Large  -359.9805*   
Clubdeal *Small * Dev   -83.47253  
Club deal *Large* Dev    -563.0085 
Small -164.3501** -138.5034** -103.566*** -104.793*** 
GDP   59.67990** 59.18250** 60.61470** 60.80253** 
GDP at exit -42.2066*** -43.8996*** -43.0284*** -42.9973*** 
GDP less 0  654.9367* 656.0185* 679.2477* 679.2423* 
GDP 2 – 5% 262.0414* 276.6730* 274.3445* 273.8317* 
GDP above 5% 123.1706 156.1184 130.9641 129.6832 
Exit GDP less 0  154.4312 140.1381 151.2777 151.1209 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -272.0675* -272.7041* -271.3501* -271.5056* 
Exit GDP > 5% -373.0468 -374.7624 -378.3776 -377.7693 
Dev * GDP less 0 -456.2127 -466.1199 -465.8206 -474.0377 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -796.0169 -814.8754 -780.5459 -774.1749 
Dev * GDP > 5% -408.5346 -432.1578 -417.809 -422.5636 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -2199.821* -2150.644** -2245.845* -2225.862* 
Dev * Exit GDP 2– 5% -647.7214 -599.1017 -671.3738 -657.2496 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  -1106.22 -1040.802 -1098.753 -1079.157 
Public offering  492.9452* 511.7445* 494.6653* 492.8871* 
SLBO -13.54296 0.810056 -5.888181 -7.37591 
Strategic Sale 184.9502*** 198.3275** 188.3800*** 186.1796*** 
Bankruptcy 165.3986 163.2823 152.1789 150.5474 
Govt effective 276.2386** 280.1797** 272.6346** 278.0936** 
# of procedures 0.915741 -0.204707 1.298887 1.489724 
Debt/Cap Ratio 0.945335 0.875511 0.936993 0.92659 
R-squared 0.29172 0.294357 0.290805 0.290847 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
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Table 26: Regression using “Return” as the dependent variable and new interaction 
variable is added to check the effect of club deals among reputed PE firms.  
            
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Variables                           Coefficients 
Constant 27.79*** 27.21*** 28.61** 26.82*** 27.2*** 
Number Days to exit -0.0035* -0.0035* -0.0033* -0.0035* -0.003* 
Quick flips 7.243*** 7.176*** 7.718*** 7.177*** 7.18*** 
Reputed 4.642 5.444*** 1.8955 5.976*** 5.44*** 
Developing -3.2467 -3.2964 -2.54630 -3.72745 -3.2964 
Same Country -4.6824 -4.6682 -4.597 -4.5684 -4.6682 
Same Industry 0.5411 0.5873 -0.03889 0.550793 0.5872 
# of PE firms 3.8561** 4.1003* 2.800*** 4.2141* 4.1002* 
Club deal * Reputed 1.8591     
Club deal * Reputed * 
Developing  -9.827    
Club deal * Reputed * 
Large   15.9969*   
Club deal * Reputed * 
Small    -6.6924  
Club*Reputed*Large
* Developing     -9.827 
Small 5.402*** 5.393*** 5.92*** 5.85*** 5.39*** 
GDP   2.2417 2.2472 2.1984 2.2467 2.2472 
GDP at exit -1.2139 -1.2136 -1.1998 -1.2172 -1.2136 
GDP less 0  -10.742 -10.738 -10.321 -10.628 -10.738 
GDP 2 – 5% -1.6023 -1.5808 -1.3225 -1.48368 -1.5808 
GDP above 5% 1.8564 1.7775 2.1852 1.855382 1.7775 
Exit GDP less 0  7.4762 7.9603 6.2851 7.863342 7.9603 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% 8.0737 8.4319 6.7198 8.738181 8.4319 
Exit GDP > 5% 3.1589 3.539 2.8009 3.549763 3.539 
Dev * GDP less 0 12.018 11.995 11.34 12.10673 11.9959 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -13.013 -12.822 -12.946 -13.3435 -12.822 
Dev * GDP > 5% -12.948 -12.898 -13.359 -12.7060 -12.89 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -12.13*** -12.1*** -12.2*** -12.1*** -12*** 
Dev*Exit GDP 2-5% 7.0602** 7.028*** 7.2870** 7.0544** 7.03*** 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  20.30*** 20.34*** 19.96*** 20.35*** 20.3*** 
Public offering  -9.2246** -9.227** -9.9147* -9.284** -9.22** 
SLBO 2.9763 2.9863 2.898 3.1095 2.9863 
Strategic Sale -7.6627 -7.643 -8.26*** -7.6199 -7.643 
Bankruptcy -8.498 -8.4492 -8.7767 -8.5796 -8.4492 
Govt effective 3.8976 4.0744 3.7482 3.9771 4.0744 
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Table 26: Continued 
# of procedures 0.1714 0.1727 0.204 0.1698 0.1727 
Debt/Cap Ratio -0.0258 -0.027 -0.02447 -0.0273 -0.027 
R-squared 0.040964 0.040932 0.043501 0.041084 0.04093 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
 
In tables 26 and 27, I add an interaction variable reputed with club deals to test 
if reputation of the PE firm has any effect if they are involved in club deals. From the 
regression results in table 26, the variable “club deals * reputation” has a positive 
coefficient showing that if the PE firm is a reputed firm and if the deal is a club deal, 
then the return of the LBO is positive (1.86%). If the reputed firm is involved in a club 
deal and the target firm is from a developing country (variable Club deal * Reputed * 
Developing), then the return of the LBO is negative.  
From variables “Club deal * Reputed * Large” and “Club deal * Reputed * 
Small”, I see that when there is a reputed PE firm involved in the transaction, club deals 
are positive if it involves a large target firm (coefficient of “Club deal * Reputed * 
Large” = 15.99%) and club deals are negative when there is a small target firm 
involved in the club deal (coefficient of ““Club deal * Reputed * small” = -6.69%). 
And finally from the variable “Club deal * Reputed * Large * Developing” (coefficient 
= -9.83%), I see that in developing countries, even in large target firms I do not see 
positive returns. To summarize, club deals are positive in case of larger target firms in 
developed countries only.  
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Table 27: Regression using “# of days to exit” as the dependent variable and new 
interaction variable is added to check the effect of club deals among reputed PE firms. 
            
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Variables                           Coefficients 
Constant 1393.72* 1446.63* 1398.8* 1508.37* 1446.6* 
Return -1.54586* -1.5553* -1.447* -1.531* -1.555* 
Quick flips -1981.7* -1976.7* -1980.9* -1968.0* -1976* 
Reputed 33.95035 -79.23989 45.79768 -136.6** -79.24 
Developing 2090.46* 2128.758* 2073.55* 2143.36* 2128.7* 
Same Country 258.52* 254.5037* 251.578* 245.02* 254.5* 
Same Industry 238.05*** 231.38*** 251.9*** 234.6*** 231*** 
# of PE firms -10.62961 -45.59601 0.436667 -57.6*** -45.596 
Club deal * Reputed -267.7**     
Club deal * Reputed * 
Developing  -563.1    
Club deal * Reputed * 
Large   -568.2*   
Club deal * Reputed * 
Small    701.40*  
Club*Reputed*Large
* Developing     -563.01 
Small -102.8*** -104.7*** -121.8** -149.9** -104*** 
GDP   60.794** 60.802** 61.54** 60.02** 60.8** 
GDP at exit -42.5*** -42.99*** -42.9*** -42.1*** -43*** 
GDP less 0  677.99* 679.24* 659.95* 664.65* 679.24* 
GDP 2 – 5% 278.0957* 273.8317* 263.44* 263.86* 273.83* 
GDP above 5% 122.0763 129.68 115.86 124.1797 129.683 
Exit GDP less 0  -2180.57* -2225.86* -2163* -2229.6* -2225* 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -597.988 -657.249 -589.18 -681.54 -657.24 
Exit GDP > 5% -1063.148 -1079.15 -1063.63 -1108.66 -1079.1 
Dev * GDP less 0 -460.0261 -474.0377 -440.66 -470.63 -474.03 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -815.363 -774.174 -794.80 -772.6 -774.17 
Dev * GDP > 5% -394.1396 -422.5636 -392.36 -424.38 -422.56 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  153.8464 151.1209 155.7541 153.194 151.12 
Dev*Exit GDP 2-5% -275.72* -271.50* -279.29* -273.3* -271.5* 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  -374.7314 -377.769 -364.95 -380.83 -377.76 
Public offering  496.9703* 492.8871* 516.850* 501.32* 492.8* 
SLBO -1.269268 -7.37591 -2.32585 -16.558 -7.3759 
Strategic Sale 194.13*** 186.17*** 209.8** 187.4*** 186*** 
Bankruptcy 162.6808 150.5474 164.2795 168.0383 150.54 
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Table 27: Continued 
Govt effective 281.134** 278.093** 277.1** 269.4** 278.0** 
# of procedures 1.01619 1.489724 0.047287 1.246965 1.4897 
Debt/Cap Ratio 0.783506 0.92659 0.843562 0.9779 0.92659 
R-squared 0.292202 0.290847 0.296327 0.293789 0.29084 
*significant at 1% confidence level. **significant at 5% confidence level. *** significant at 
10% confidence level.  
 
 
In case of club deals in developing countries and also club deals in smaller 
target firms in developed nations, club deals are not profitable. This is because of the 
agency costs involved due to conflicts between the PE firms involved in club deals. As 
mentioned in Masulis and Thomas (2009), club deals are not all that profitable due to 
agency cost that arises out of multiple PE firms sponsoring an LBO deal. In a club deal, 
there are additional conflicts of interest between LBO sponsors. These conflicts could 
result in more agency costs in terms of free riding by some sponsoring private-equity 
firms and disagreements among others over a target company’s major policies or 
proposed policy changes, especially when a firm is performing poorly. However, this 
potential cost can be minimized by limiting the size of club deals to two or three 
investors, which is the norm. They also mention another possible disadvantage of these 
syndicated LBO deal, that the future portfolio company’s stock appears to experience 
more insider trading activity prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
From the regression results in table 27, the variable “club deals * reputation” has a 
negative coefficient showing that if the PE firm is a reputed firm and if the deal is a 
club deal, then the LBO exits sooner by 268 days. If the reputed firm is involved in a 
club deal and the target firm is from a developing country (variable Club deal * 
Reputed * Developing), then the return of the LBO is negative. In this case, club deals 
exit sooner by 563 days. From variables “Club deal * Reputed * Large” and “Club deal 
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* Reputed * Small”, I see that when there is a reputed PE firm involved in the 
transaction, larger club deals exits sooner; and smaller club deals take longer time 
periods to exit. This is because of the low riskiness of the club deal involving large 
target firm which helps the PE firms to exit the LBO faster. And finally from the 
variable “Club deal * Reputed * Large * Developing”, I see that club deals exit sooner 
in developing nations when it involves a large target firm and at-least one reputed PE 
firm. To summarize, club deals exit sooner in case of larger target firms in developed 
countries and developing countries. Club deals involving smaller target firms take 
longer time to exit. This is again due to conflicts between the PE firms involved in club 
deals.  
Table 28 looks at regression results where Annual Return is the dependent 
variable and individual number of PE firms are included as explanatory variables. From 
the results, if the target firms take more number of days to exit, then the return will be 
lower. Quick flips provide higher return of 2.11%. Reputed PE firms result in 7% 
higher returns. If the target firm is from a developing country then the return is 8% 
lower. When the number of PE firms is 2, return is 2.18% higher. When there are 3 or 4 
firms involved in the transaction, the returns are negative. This could be due to greater 
discrepancies between each of the PE firms in such transactions. However when there 
are 5 or greater number of PE firms, returns are very high. This is because these 
transactions are very large and hence the PE firms have the advantage to reduce 
competing bids for the target firms.    
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Table 28: Regression with return as dependent variable and number of PE firms 1-8 
included as explanatory variables 
          
Variables                           Coeffieient P-value Coeffieient P-value 
Constant 40.49423 0.0000 42.45497 0.0000 
Days to Exit -0.004296 0.0000 -0.004466 0.0000 
Quick flips 2.11321 0.5930 1.343267 0.7350 
Reputed 7.059797 0.0160 7.818315 0.0080 
Developing -8.138764 0.2010 -9.053397 0.1560 
Same Country -3.762945 0.2660 -3.590926 0.2900 
Same Industry -1.605671 0.7930 0.3731692 0.9520 
# of PE firms (1)   -1.951466 0.4630 
2 2.182086 0.4790   
3 -5.638718 0.2020   
4 -9.211076 0.3560   
5 37.1848 0.0050   
6 65.15801 0.0000   
7 30.80377 0.2370   
8 134.0828 0.0360   
Small 7.895577 0.0030 8.35142 0.0020 
R-squared 0.0274   0.017   
 
In table 28, when the variable “one PE firm” is included, the co-efficient if 
negative. This means that non-club deals are less profitable when compared to club 
deals. If there is just one PE firm involved in the transaction, then the returns are -
1.95%. This shows that club deals lead to higher returns as compared to non-club deals.  
Table 29 shows results of OLS regression where “Number of days to exit” from 
the initial LBO period is the dependent variable. From the results, higher returns tend to 
make the firms exit sooner. If the PE firms are reputed, then the LBOs exit sooner. If 
the target firms are from a developing country then the LBOs exit sooner. Also from 
the two regression results in table 29, it can be seen that club deals (2 or more PE firms) 
exit sooner when compared to non-club deals (one PE firm). When there are 2 PE firms 
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involved in the transaction, the deal takes 186 fewer days to exit. And when there are 3 
PE firms involved in the transaction, the LBOs exit 54 days sooner.  
In the regression which involves “one PE firm” as the explanatory variable, the 
coefficient of “# of PE firms (1)” is 145.8. This shows that if there is just one PE firm 
involved in the LBO transaction (non-club deal) then it takes longer time periods to exit 
the LBO.  
Table 29: Regression with “Number of days to exit” as dependent variable and number 
of PE firms 1-8 included as explanatory variables 
     
Variables                           Coeffieient P-value Coeffieient P-value 
Constant 2325.363 0.0000 2182.86 0.0000 
Return -1.895491 0.0000 -1.947765 0.0000 
Quick flips -1979.627 0.0000 -1979.696 0.0000 
Reputed -20.07995 0.7450 -18.71882 0.7600 
Developing -178.5271 0.1810 -170.1572 0.2020 
Same Country 369.7882 0.0000 369.1985 0.0000 
Same Industry 254.9037 0.0480 247.6251 0.0530 
# of PE firms (1)    145.8226 0.0090 
2 -186.5177 0.0040   
3 -54.3395 0.5580   
4 0.1423318 0.9990   
5 -157.4161 0.5760   
6 -417.4677 0.1800   
7 -31.15574 0.9550   
8 -278.8822 0.8360   
Small -255.1802 0.0000 -259.663 0.0000 
R-squared 0.2277   0.2285   
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Table 30: Negative binomial regression with “Number of days to exit” as dependent 
variable and inclusion of club deals sorted based in the time period in which the initial 
transaction occurred. 
      
Variables Co-efficient p-value 
Constant 7.4775 0.0000 
Return -0.0009 0.0000 
Quick flips -1.6165 0.0000 
Reputed -0.0195 0.4400 
Same Country 0.0686 0.0280 
Same Industry 0.0163 0.7580 
# of PE firms 0.0219 0.2760 
Club * 1980s 0.6020 0.0000 
Club * 1990s 0.0393339 0.3550 
Club * 2000s -0.2953383 0.0000 
Club * 2010-12 -0.466238 0.2110 
Small -0.0240082 0.3240 
GDP 0.0172211 0.1580 
GDP at exit  -0.0289489 0.0010 
GDP less 0  0.177018 0.0140 
GDP 2 – 5% 0.0986 0.0170 
GDP above 5% 0.0282 0.7730 
Exit GDP less 0  -0.0144 0.7770 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -0.0951 0.0010 
Exit GDP > 5% -0.0863059 0.3610 
Dev * GDP less 0 0.2439856 0.2190 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% 0.1732768 0.3860 
Dev * GDP > 5% 0.2213854 0.2800 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -0.6624826 0.0180 
Dev *Exit GDP 2-5% 0.176297 0.3310 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5% -0.0948188 0.634 
Public offering  0.1910 0.0000 
SLBO 0.0307 0.3450 
Strategic Sale 0.0994 0.0120 
Bankruptcy 0.1220 0.0410 
Govt effective 0.0895 0.0690 
# of procedures -0.0005 0.9050 
Debt/Cap Ratio 0.0003 0.4700 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0424   
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Table 30 shows results of negative binomial regression where number of days to 
exit is the dependent variable. From the results, reputed PE firms exit sooner. If the 
return from the transaction is higher, then the LBO exits sooner. Among the 
explanatory variables, club deals are sorted based on the time period in which the initial 
LBO transaction took place. Club deals in the 1980s (club * 1980s) and 1990s (club * 
1990s) take longer time periods to exit and club deals after the year 2000 exit sooner 
(“club * 2000s” and “club * 2010-12”). This is because after the year 2006 there was 
higher government scrutiny about the motive of club deals and hence the club deals 
were unable to exit sooner. OLS regression using the same variables in table 30 gave 
similar results. 
Comparing the exit periods of developing economies during different exit time 
GDP benchmarks (variables “Dev * Exit GDP < 0”, “Dev * Exit GDP 2-5%” and “Dev 
* Exit GDP > 5%”). LBOs exit sooner during periods of high GDP and during periods 
of low GDP. During moderate GDP benchmark, the exit periods are slower for 
developing economies.    
Table 31 shows OLS regression using “annualized return” of the LBO as the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables that include time period in which the 
club deal transaction took place. From the results, when the PE firm is reputed, it leads 
to higher returns of 5.24%.  
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 Table 31: OLS regression with “Annualized return” as dependent variable and 
inclusion of club deals sorted based in the time period in which the initial transaction 
occurred. 
      
Variables Co-efficient p-value 
Constant 24.84003 0.0870 
Days to exit -0.0038 0.0000 
Quick flips 7.2453 0.0770 
Reputed 5.2375 0.0840 
Same Country -4.3974 0.2350 
Same Industry 0.5477 0.9310 
# of PE firms 7.65991 0.0010 
Club * 1980s 20.67761 0.1340 
Club * 1990s 10.9727 0.0300 
Club * 2000s -6.8093 0.1730 
Club * 2010-12 -105.3140 0.0180 
Small 5.5266 0.0590 
GDP 2.2712 0.1140 
GDP at exit  -1.373532 0.2010 
GDP less 0  -10.25262 0.2360 
GDP 2 – 5% -0.6315 0.8950 
GDP above 5% 0.9870 0.9310 
Exit GDP less 0  4.9055 0.8870 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% 6.2058 0.7960 
Exit GDP > 5% 1.1936 0.9640 
Dev * GDP less 0 9.790469 0.7210 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -15.39437 0.5540 
Dev * GDP > 5% -13.4079 0.6200 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -12.82 0.044 
Dev * Exit GDP 2 - 5% 7.4903 0.037 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5% 21.2125 0.059 
Public offering  -8.6008 0.0230 
SLBO 3.070152 0.4300 
Strategic Sale -7.686658 0.1050 
Bankruptcy -8.2168 0.2510 
Govt effective 3.8301 0.5130 
# of procedures 0.1398 0.7750 
Debt/Cap Ratio -0.0296 0.5150 
R-squared 0.0461   
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In table 31, when the club deals happened in the 1980s then the returns are 
positive. This is because there was less government scrutiny and also the economy was 
in a boom. Hence during the 1980s the club deals results in 20.67% higher returns.  In 
the 1990s club deals have returns that are lower in absolute terms due recession in early 
1990s. However, club deal returns are positive in the 1990s time period. In the 2000s 
there was higher government scrutiny about the motive of club deals after the 2005 
time period. Also there was the great depression in 2008-2009 time period. Hence club 
deals after the year 2000 results in negative returns.  
In table 32 and 33 I look at the returns and the days to exit respectively when 
club deals are sorted based on post 2006 period and pre 2006 period. In the year 2006 
there was higher scrutiny about the motive of club deals and hence club deals were not 
intentionally reducing competition. From the table 32, it is evident that club deals were 
profitable pre-2006 period (1.13%) and after 2006 they have negative returns (-7.66%). 
This clearly shows that after 2006, the benign motive of club deals were reduced. Also 
from table 33, club deals were able to exit sooner by 1017 days pre-2006 period.  And 
after the year 2006, club deals took longer periods to exit (days to exit = 40.82 days 
longer). The results in tables 32 and 33, prove Hypothesis 5 that club deals were more 
profitable and exit sooner until 2006 and after that they were not that profitable and 
took longer time to exit.  
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Table 32: OLS regression with “return” as dependent variable and explanatory 
variables “club deals pre and post 2006” 
          
Variables                        Coefficient     p-val            Coefficient          p-val 
Constant 27.30165 0.061 24.21493 0.099 
Days to exit -.0035415 0.000 -.003536 0.000 
Quick flips 7.184168 0.079 7.04176 0.085 
Reputed 5.421187 0.073 5.583186 0.065 
Developing -3.421062 0.929 -2.8055 0.942 
Same Country -4.656373 0.210 -4.3365 0.243 
Same Industry .595061 0.925 .7217591 0.910 
# of PE firms 4.064928 0.005 7.037937 0.001 
Club deal * pre 2006 1.131155 0.893   
Club deal * post 2006   -7.66229 0.068 
Small 5.422242 0.065 5.452213 0.063 
GDP   2.261647 0.117 2.2766 0.112 
GDP at exit -1.209295 0.261 -1.2533 0.244 
GDP less 0  -10.75583 0.215 -10.464 0.227 
GDP 2 – 5% -1.607601 0.737 -1.0221 0.831 
GDP above 5% 1.723051 0.880 2.707114 0.813 
Exit GDP less 0  7.861901 0.846 7.541465 0.852 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% 8.414477 0.805 7.413595 0.828 
Exit GDP > 5% 3.285474 0.923 3.211548 0.925 
Dev * GDP less 0 12.19626 0.727 12.4486 0.721 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -13.19278 0.663 -13.3235 0.660 
Dev * GDP > 5% -12.81554 0.678 -13.7736 0.656 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -12.13731 0.057 -12.647 0.047 
Dev * Exit GDP 2– 5% 7.067475 0.050 7.452916 0.038 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  20.34546 0.071 20.17247 0.073 
Public offering  -9.167916 0.016 -8.79013 0.021 
SLBO 3.047951 0.434 3.67151 0.347 
Strategic Sale -7.59106 0.111 -7.51028 0.114 
Bankruptcy -8.364178 0.244 -7.9267 0.269 
Govt effective 3.951967 0.507 3.940632 0.508 
# of procedures .1712297 0.727 .1587199 0.746 
Debt/Cap Ratio -.0268844 0.554 -.02995 0.510 
R-squared 0.0299  0.0311  
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Table 33: OLS regression with “days to exit” as dependent variable and explanatory 
variables “club deals pre and post 2006” 
         
Variables                        Coefficient     p-val            Coefficient          p-val 
Constant 1509.337 0.000 1473.043 0.000 
Return -1.52819 0.000 -1.54797 0.000 
Quick flips -1953.786 0.000 -1975.72 0.000 
Reputed -69.18573 0.271 -80.7619 0.201 
Developing 2084.319 0.009 2117.698 0.008 
Same Country 252.0691 0.001 253.5213 0.001 
Same Industry 223.5618 0.090 230.7996 0.082 
# of PE firms -14.40266 0.630 -61.3529 0.172 
Club deal * pre 2006 -1017.169 0.000   
Club deal * post 2006   40.82346 0.642 
Small -114.8018 0.060 -104.176 0.089 
GDP   43.86259 0.143 60.42183 0.044 
GDP at exit -44.74551 0.045 -42.6729 0.058 
GDP less 0  683.5883 0.000 677.687 0.000 
GDP 2 – 5% 302.1223 0.002 271.3735 0.007 
GDP above 5% 196.0191 0.409 125.9627 0.598 
Exit GDP less 0  168.8362 0.202 154.7357 0.246 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -303.7731 0.000 -273.819 0.000 
Exit GDP > 5% -390.7715 0.095 -378.273 0.108 
Dev * GDP less 0 -569.735 0.432 -471.396 0.518 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -765.0787 0.224 -793.275 0.210 
Dev * GDP > 5% -394.8371 0.539 -411.482 0.524 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -2244.242 0.008 -2232.55 0.008 
Dev * Exit GDP 2– 5% -602.1877 0.396 -649.854 0.363 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5%  -1030.737 0.145 -1090.10 0.125 
Public offering  458.454 0.000 492.299 0.000 
SLBO -40.49344 0.617 -9.59566 0.906 
Strategic Sale 162.8418 0.100 187.2136 0.060 
Bankruptcy 97.50782 0.513 149.4871 0.319 
Govt effective 280.7048 0.023 271.97 0.029 
# of procedures -.3126607 0.976 1.356244 0.895 
Debt/Cap Ratio .8765135 0.353 .9519138 0.317 
R-squared 0.2920  0.2827  
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Table 38 in APPENDIX E, shows that if the deal is a club deal, then if the target 
firm is smaller, then it exits the LBO sooner; and in a club deal, larger firms take longer 
time to exit. Also among deals where the buyer firm is reputed, if the target firm is 
smaller, then the firm exits sooner; and the target firm is large, the LBO takes more 
number of days to exit. 
I test if the industry of the target firm or the issuer firm has an influence on the 
returns or exit patterns of the LBOs (results in APPENDIX A, B and C). Generally 
target firms in high growth industries tend to perform better and have shorter exit 
periods than those in slower growth industries. There have been studies that show that 
certain industries perform better than others. Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2012) find that 
industries with higher visibility have lower returns. Ambrose and Winters (1992) found 
that industry effect does not exist. They show that there is LBO activity is not found to 
be higher in any specific industry.  
In my study, from results in APPENDIX A, I find that during the period 1980-
1990, automobiles, healthcare, chemicals, consumer good and construction had the 
highest returns in the same order. Mining, finance and technology industries performed 
poorly during this period.  
From the results in APPENDIX B, during the period 1991 – 2000, telecom 
industry performed good and most of the other industries performed poorly. This was 
because of the recession in early 1990s.  
In APPENDIX C: in the time period between 2001 to 2012, returns of 
healthcare and financial industries were high. Whereas most of the other industries 
performed badly, due to the recession in this period Appendices A, B and C.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The results show that LBO targets in developed nations have higher returns on 
average. However, when I look at LBOs in developing nations during the period of 
higher GDP growth rates, I find that the LBOs have higher returns.  
During periods of very high economic growth and in periods of negative 
economic growth, LBOs in developing economies take shorter time to exit when 
compared to LBOs in developed economies. This is because of high returns of 
developing nations during periods of higher growth periods that they would like to take 
by exiting sooner; and also the PE firms also try to avoid major losses if the economic 
growth rate becomes negative and hence exits sooner.  
I find that reputed PE firms result in higher returns and lesser days to exit. I also 
find that smaller firms have higher returns when compared to the larger firms, and take 
lesser days to exit.  The results also show that club deals result in higher returns and 
take shorter time to exit when compared with single PE deals in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This is because of the reputation of the syndicate of firms in club deals which lets them 
get better terms on the initial LBO and hence it results in higher returns. Moreover, due 
to the reputation of club deal firms, they can also exit sooner. After the year 2006 there 
was higher government scrutiny about the motive of club deals and hence they exit 
alter. However club deals of in developing economies are not profitable and exit 
sooner.   
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 34 SHOWING REGRESSION RESULTS WITH RETURN 
AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND VARIOUS INDUSTRIES AS 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES (LBOS DURING THE PERIOD 1981-1990) 
          
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t-
stastictic p-value 
C 20.9900 20.8700 1.0057 0.3156 
AUTO_N_PARTS 72.58275 24.6937 2.939324 0.0036 
CHEMICALS 19.55005 26.9430 0.725607 0.4689 
COMMERCIAL_SER -3.2079 24.6937 -0.1299 0.8968 
CONST_N_MAT 15.0096 21.7585 0.6898 0.4910 
CONUMER_GOODS 16.8042 21.1261 0.795425 0.4272 
CONSUMER_SERV 5.516895 22.4180 0.246093 0.8058 
ELECTRONIC 1.6079 29.5146 0.0545 0.9566 
FIN -10.5675 24.0986 -0.4385 0.6614 
HEALTHCARE 19.55005 21.3984 0.913622 0.3619 
IND_MACHIN 9.148708 25.5604 0.357925 0.7207 
IND_METALS 12.0790 23.6643 0.5104 0.6103 
IND  5.0785 23.0726 0.2201 0.8260 
MINING -20.92115 29.5146 -0.70884 0.4792 
OIL 2.117694 26.9430 0.078599 0.9374 
TECH -3.8340 21.5327 -0.1781 0.8588 
R-squared = 0.168851 
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APPENDIX B: TABLE 35 SHOWING REGRESSION RESULTS WITH RETURN 
AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND VARIOUS INDUSTRIES AS 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES (LBOS DURING THE PERIOD 1991-2000) 
          
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t-
stastictic p-value 
C 55.6067 10.80335 5.147172 0.0000 
AIRLINES -36.9493 24.15702 -1.52954 0.1263 
AUTO_N_PARTS -22.9964 12.4966 -1.8402 0.0659 
CHEMICALS -17.2516 12.4121 -1.3899 0.1647 
COMMERCIAL_SER -18.874 11.5450 -1.6348 0.1022 
CONST_N_MAT -19.4485 11.63556 -1.67147 0.0948 
CONUMER_GOODS -21.1607 11.06529 -1.91235 0.0560 
CONSUMER_SERV -19.4000 11.4301 -1.6973 0.0898 
ELECTRONIC -58.2087 17.7986 -3.2704 0.0011 
FIN -21.4769 12.5660 -1.7091 0.0876 
HEALTHCARE -30.0294 11.48633 -2.61436 0.0090 
IND_MACHIN -11.8484 12.81361 -0.92467 0.3552 
IND_METALS -27.2220 12.9476 -2.1025 0.0356 
IND  -13.7934 11.7244 -1.1765 0.2395 
MINING -40.9771 28.5830 -1.4336 0.1518 
OIL -33.7015 13.73082 -2.45444 0.0142 
TECH -16.5608 11.28373 -1.46767 0.1423 
TELE 39.7086 17.0816 2.3246 0.0202 
TRANS -25.0982 14.0265 -1.7893 0.0737 
UTILITIES -22.1432 54.0168 -0.4099 0.6819 
R-squared = 0.023044 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 36 SHOWING REGRESSION RESULTS WITH RETURN 
AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND VARIOUS INDUSTRIES AS 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES (LBOS DURING THE PERIOD 2001-2012) 
          
Variables Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t-
stastictic p-value 
C 42.8158 6.8903 6.2139 0.0000 
AIRLINES -7.7136 13.4318 -0.5743 0.5658 
AUTO_N_PARTS -3.4508 8.0797 -0.4271 0.6693 
CHEMICALS -8.0525 8.0234 -1.0036 0.3156 
COMMERCIAL_SER -2.9852 7.4321 -0.4017 0.6880 
CONST_N_MAT -3.3083 7.3724 -0.4487 0.6537 
CONUMER_GOODS -5.8485 7.0789 -0.8262 0.4088 
CONSUMER_SERV -2.9942 7.2117 -0.4152 0.6780 
ELECTRONIC 17.7230 16.4023 1.0805 0.2800 
FIN -7.4126 7.5962 -0.9758 0.3292 
HEALTHCARE 0.5591 7.3943 0.0756 0.9397 
IND_MACHIN -25.2135 9.4817 -2.6592 0.0079 
IND_METALS -4.2889 8.6483 -0.4959 0.6200 
IND  -1.1898 7.4088 -0.1606 0.8724 
MINING -2.2758 32.3186 -0.0704 0.9439 
OIL -6.6979 8.0324 -0.8339 0.4044 
TECH -10.9584 7.2282 -1.5161 0.1296 
TELE -1.9141 9.2641 -0.2066 0.8363 
TRANS -10.1235 9.9300 -1.0195 0.3080 
UTILITIES -1.9000 11.5833 -0.1640 0.8697 
R-squared = 0.008606 
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APPENDIX D: TABLE 37: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION USING “DAYS 
TO EXIT” AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
      
Variables 
Co-
efficient p-value 
Constant 7.3112 0.0000 
Return -0.0009 0.0000 
Quick flips -1.6507 0.0000 
Reputed -0.0272 0.2880 
Developing 1.1357 0.0010 
Same Country 0.0875 0.0060 
Same Industry 0.0387 0.4750 
# of PE firms -0.0115 0.3370 
Small -0.0307 0.2170 
GDP 0.0258 0.0380 
GDP at exit  -0.0264 0.0040 
GDP less 0  0.2322 0.0020 
GDP 2 – 5% 0.1159 0.0060 
GDP above 5% 0.0602 0.5450 
Exit GDP less 0  -0.0127 0.8110 
Exit GDP 2 – 5% -0.0915 0.0020 
Exit GDP > 5% -0.1381 0.1500 
Dev * GDP less 0 -0.5763 0.0620 
Dev * GDP 2 - 5% -0.3107 0.2240 
Dev * GDP > 5% -0.2357 0.3620 
Dev * Exit GDP < 0  -1.2353 0.0010 
Dev * Exit GDP 2 - 5% -0.5247 0.0990 
Dev*Exit GDP > 5% -0.6605 0.0310 
Public offering  0.2009 0.0000 
SLBO 0.0151 0.6470 
Strategic Sale 0.1100 0.0070 
Bankruptcy 0.1184 0.0520 
Govt effective 0.1490 0.0030 
# of procedures 0.0021 0.6210 
Debt/Cap Ratio 0.0004 0.3790 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0397   
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APPENDIX E: TABLE 38: REGRESSION WITH RETURNS AS THE DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE. Table 38 includes interaction variables of club deal with size of the target 
firm; and interaction of reputation with the size of the target firm. 
        
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
C 26.3345 0.072 26.0437 0.075 
Days to Exit -0.0036 0.000 -0.0035 0.000 
Quick Flips 7.0344 0.085 7.1763 0.078 
Reputed -4.0227 0.385 -3.0022 0.517 
Developing -1.0373 0.978 -0.1870 0.996 
Same Country  -4.6151 0.213 -4.4475 0.230 
Same Industry  0.0306 0.996 -0.1507 0.981 
# of PE firms  4.3574 0.016 5.4253 0.002 
Club Deal * Small -5.4525 0.324 -7.0839 0.200 
Club Deal * Medium   -6.2438 0.167 
Club Deal * Large -0.8676 0.875   
Reputation * Small 3.7617 0.633 2.6998 0.732 
Reputation * Large 19.9058 0.001 16.5817 0.005 
Small 7.5758 0.029 6.8242 0.052 
GDP 2.2050 0.124 2.1440 0.134 
GDP at Exit  -1.2527 0.243 -1.2583 0.241 
GDP less 0 -9.3648 0.280 -9.3119 0.283 
GDP between 2-5% -0.6738 0.888 -0.4636 0.923 
GDP above 5% 2.1108 0.853 2.5897 0.820 
Exit GDP less 0 -12.4773 0.050 -12.4594 0.050 
Exit GDP between 2-5% 7.4327 0.038 7.5254 0.036 
Exit GDP above 5% 20.5158 0.068 20.2869 0.071 
Dev * GDP less 0 10.0877 0.772 10.1767 0.770 
Dev * GDP 2-5% -13.4612 0.656 -13.0295 0.666 
Dev * GDP above 5 -13.2109 0.669 -13.3941 0.664 
Dev * Exit less 0 5.2237 0.897 4.2450 0.916 
Dev * Exit GDP betw 2-5% 7.1231 0.835 5.7637 0.866 
Dev * Exit GDP above 5% 3.6870 0.914 2.5873 0.939 
Public Offering -10.8454 0.004 -10.8231 0.005 
SLBO 2.6308 0.499 2.7577 0.478 
Strategic Sale -8.7442 0.066 -8.8763 0.062 
Bankruptcy -9.3091 0.194 -9.0812 0.205 
Gov 4.5743 0.442 4.4272 0.457 
Numb of proced 0.1967 0.688 0.1949 0.690 
Target debt/cap ratio -0.0372 0.413 -0.0371 0.415 
R-squared 0.0464  0.0471  
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 39: DEPENDENT VARIABLE “NUMBER OF DAYS TO 
EXIT” THE LBO.  
Table 39 includes interaction variables of club deal with size of the target firm; and 
interaction of reputation with the size of the target firm. 
     
Variable Coefficient p-value 
C 971.9266 0.004 
Return -2.33531 0.000 
Reputed -407.2751 0.000 
Developing 2582.104 0.004 
Same Country  257.9821 0.003 
Same Industry  263.5625 0.074 
# of PE firms  47.62479 0.257 
Club Deal * Small 97.8291 0.450 
Club Deal * Large 410.8265 0.001 
Reputation * Small -575.6971 0.002 
Reputation * Large 363.4991 0.012 
Small -224.4137 0.005 
GDP 104.2994 0.002 
GDP at Exit  -68.77574 0.006 
GDP less 0 645.5803 0.001 
GDP between 2-5% 173.2331 0.120 
GDP above 5% -86.60249 0.741 
Exit GDP less 0 8.09707 0.957 
Exit GDP between 2-5% -321.9554 0.000 
Exit GDP above 5% -311.8812 0.231 
Dev * GDP less 0 -666.0395 0.415 
Dev * GDP 2-5% -678.6848 0.339 
Dev * GDP above 5 -746.7649 0.301 
Dev * Exit less 0 -2761.902 0.004 
Dev * Exit GDP betw 2-5% -672.4689 0.401 
Dev * Exit GDP above 5% -1338.176 0.093 
Public Offering 519.1856 0.000 
SLBO 145.5043 0.108 
Strategic Sale 357.4337 0.001 
Bankruptcy -33.05359 0.829 
Gov 380.5865 0.006 
Numb of proced -5.51522 0.630 
Target debt/cap ratio 1.302547 0.223 
R-squared 0.112893  
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APPENDIX G: GRAPH FROM AN ARTICLE BY GAVYN DAVIES, MARCH 2011, 
FINANCIAL TIMES BLOG COMPARES AVERAGE ECONOMIC GROWTH 
RATE OF DEVELOPED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES. 
 
 
